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# Investing cognitions in emotions? Is that what really matters? A methodological review on Daniel Goleman's *emotional intelligence* book (1996) in line with cognitive-behavioural psychotherapeutic postulates

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**Abstract**

Since the publication of Goleman's book, in 1996, there has been an explosion in the use of his arguments that emotions are those which really generate cognitions and not the other way around. According to a layman's point of view, people who feel certain emotions, they then think how to execute them. To use one of the main emotions, the author speaks about in most pages of his book, is that of anger: anger is a very strong emotion; one may become passive-aggressive; another may employ it as a response to a real or hypothetical external threat. As a process -using an emotion to generate thinking- seems and sounds to be correct, and primarily I would agree to that, however does that mean that this is the only scientific/methodological answer? This paper is a review on Goleman's argument and attempts to present conceptual shortcomings which haven't been taken into consideration when the author was presenting his argument. In this review, the order we follow to outline our counterargument to emotional intelligence are the cognitive and behavioural ABC (activating event-beliefs-consequences) models in the relationship between a trigger, a thought pattern, an emotional presentation, and a behavioural reaction, according to the CBT (cognitive-behavioural therapy) perspective. In this paper, there will also be offered connections between the emotional intelligence argument and a writing by Voltaire, a writing by Schwab & Maleret, a writing by Soros, and a writing by Bock-Côté. In the latter author, there will be finally offered some juxtapositions in line with the paradigm of psychology of religion.

Keywords: emotional intelligence, cognitive intelligence, emotions, cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), conceptual shortcomings, psychology of religion.

## Prolegomena

This book is all about emotions and the intelligence they present/exhibit against the importance of the intelligence of cognitions. The main argument of the author is that cognitions are derivatives of emotions. According to the author, intelligence resides only within emotions, whereas cognitions are patterns of expression and not genuine characteristics of the faculties of the brain. In this review, I present and discuss counterarguments drawn from the cognitive-behavioural therapy modality that cognitions can have what we call *intelligence* which generates specific emotional reactivity and it is not that cognitions are by-products of emotions. The author what also includes in his presentation of emotions are also instincts and aggression deriving from them, which he considers them as of prime importance when discusses anger. In his book the author uses neuroscientific considerations about emotions which have as their basis the area of amygdala in the brain. The author's axis in presenting his case of emotional intelligence rests upon the following pillars:

1. Amygdala.
2. Anger as the main emotion which governs human life -this is what appears in the book based on examples the author uses and explanations he provides afterwards.
3. EQ (emotional quotient) instead of IQ (intelligence quotient).

One other thing the author doesn't do in his book is to speak not only about emotional intelligence, but about emotional health too. His presentation of emotional intelligence does not

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include a presentation how emotions can be healthy. His main argument about emotions is that they seem to be primarily unhealthy, such as anger he's referring to predominantly. We need emotions to be healthy because in this way:

> "…we need to emphasise…the ability to distinguish (between)…irrational and unrealistic emotions. (Some emotions are subordinate to some others, such as)…anger is subordinate to fear – you cannot be angry unless you are a little afraid…", p. 18 (Johnson, 2005).

The author's argument on emotional intelligence is deconstructed in the light of CBT (cognitive-behavioural therapy). In my attempt to explain how cognitions generate emotions, I employ past and present CBT literature which outline that emotional reactions have their antecedents in cognitive appraisals, the combination of which both result to avoidant behaviours. To review the author's book, I will refer to specific extracts of his book on which I will then comment on. The book's extract will precede, and the comment will follow.

**Introductory statement**

The author, though on the forehead of his book, writes that "emotional intelligence…matters more than IQ", he doesn't explain why that is so. In the pages of his book, he doesn't refer to IQ, or compare emotional intelligence to it, at all. What he doesn't also underline is why he replaces IQ with an emotional intelligence quotient. What we can assume is that emotional intelligence matters more than IQ because the latter has been replaced by the emotional IQ which 'swaps away' any cognitive adherence; the latter is his general thesis though no specific scientific expertise is aligned to support such premise. One explanation could be that for cognitive and/or emotional IQ to be explained there's the need of taking into consideration, language, cultural differences, individual differences between people, as well as temporal and spatial abilities, upon which not one but multiple intelligences -just like multiple individual differences between people- can be found.

Intelligence is about a "…diverse set of cognitive skills in which people may differ", evidently providing us with the knowledge that "with such diversity seemingly belying the usefulness of intelligence as an explanatory construct", all intelligences may be questionable as to the degree whether a single cognitive intelligence could account for, let alone an emotional intelligence too (comp. Williams et al., 2008: 220). We are not confusing emotional IQ with emotional quotient (EQ): the former is about the intelligence found in emotions which lead to decision-making; the latter is about similarities between an actor's emotions to those of a recipient's; somehow parallel to the theory of mind for cognitions: a theory of mind for emotions.

Interestingly, what was found was that emotional intelligence is demonstrated impulsively, whereas cognitive interference is what matters for the cognitive quotient of intelligence in tackling specific elements of knowledge and elaborating them according to one's differing decisions and actions: "…impulsivity (premature execution of the response), but not interference (ability to inhibit processing of irrelevant information), is important for regulation of emotional information. However, interference, but not impulsivity, is related to IQ", pp. 4-5 (comp. Checa & Berrocal, 2015).

The latter quotation is added evidence that emotional intelligence is impulsive, for interference is missing to provide intuition to what is being emotionally felt and decided to be acted upon. In the above paper, what is also expressed in the abstract is that emotional intelligence is in use because of cognitive intelligence: the former cannot be in effect without the latter: "…results suggest that not only is IQ crucial, but also competences related to EI are essential to human cognitive control processes", p. 1. If emotional intelligence is not controlled by cognitive intelligence "…to manage emotions…it is associated with aggression and irresponsible behavior…", ibid., p. 2. The reason probably being that "…emotional intelligence still involves cognitive skill in the use of emotion", p. 39 (comp. Lungo, 2014).

The basis of the discussion in this paper will be the presentation of 19 conceptual shortcomings as these appear in relevant pages of Goleman's book. Each conceptual shortcoming will conclude each section of our query and research on the author's main argument of emotional intelligence. The

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purpose of identifying conceptual shortcomings is not a criticism on Goleman's thesis, but a further understanding on what is missing from the emotional intelligence argument when taking into consideration premises from the CBT paradigm.

**Conceptual shortcoming no. 1**

**Book extract (p. ix):**

The author starts his argument on emotional intelligence with a translation of a passage by Aristotle taken from his book titled *The Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, chapter 9 (2.9, 1109a.27),* which the author uses as follows:

> "Anyone can become angry-that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way-this is not easy".

The (whole) passage as it appears in Aristotle's book (original Greek translated in English) is as follows:

> Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· **οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον**· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ: «τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε νῆα-That is (to say), virtue is the moral state (between two extremes), and how that is? (Virtue) is the middle state between two vices, one (being) excessiveness and the other, defect; (virtue) as such, befittingly said, is the objective (of both) passions and actions; for this reason, (virtue) is an important deed. Within everyone, thus, this middle state undertakes the work, as it is that the middle of the circle, is known to be by whom who is an expert and not by everyone; therefore, **everyone can be angry and that's easy**, (just as is) **to give money and spend them; in which way and how much and when and for what cause and until which point, isn't easy for everyone**; for this reason, what is good is rare and praiseworthy and nice. Therefore, that who aims for this middle, at first should deviate from what is rather opposite, just like Calypso exhorts: keep the ship away from smoke and wave».

The passage's extract the author refers to is highlighted in both Greek and English. The methodological shortcoming in the author's 'translation' of the passage is that several concepts are not included in that, such as:

1. Aristotle's example is not to present anger only; anger is just one of the two examples the philosopher employs, for he also employs the example of spending money as well. The fact that Aristotle underlines "**in which way and how much and when and for what cause and until which point**", that is for both anger and spending money, i.e., anger and spending money need to be questioned according to the interrogative pronouns above, and not only anger; the author doesn't present that -actually, the sentence about *spending money*, is missing from the text's translation the author outlines.
2. The topic discussed in the whole paragraph by Aristotle is about virtue, which he presents as the middle capacity between extravagance and defect. One in demonstrating anger and/or their wish to spend money, the way they experience the former and how they execute the latter is according to the tug-of-war between extravagance and defect. Anger is an extreme; spending money excessively is another extreme: anyone can have both. Money and anger relate to the fact that do not relate to virtue if the former is spent excessively and the latter is experienced excessively. The virtue that is in the middle and undertakes the work it means it

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balances excess and defect. Aristotle does not refer to anger and/or spending money in this passage but to the meaning that virtue is the middle one not falling into excesses.

3. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a work that presents and discusses virtue and how this may be accomplished as a learned process in one's life. What he does in the end of this passage is that he uses a kind of justification from Calypso (from Homer's book Odyssey) who says one to "keep the ship away from smoke and wave" defining that *one to keep oneself away from things that mean nothing*.

If it is a virtue to distinguish anger and control it and how to spend money and control excessive purchasing; then, in a CBT perspective, that helps the mind managing intrusive thinking about excess and balancing emotions such as anger, directing also one not to be superfluous in the acquisition of material things (comp. Beck & Fernandez, 2004; Granero et al., 2017; Javed et al., 2022)[1]. That to happen, non-intrusive thinking takes over and controls emotional reactivity (comp. Young & Klosko, 1994). In cognitive-behavioural therapy terms, non-intrusive thinking is non-impulsive thinking because it is governed by a mindset that is ready to challenge its own negative thinking without been affected by automatic emotional and behavioural choices (comp. Gay et al., 2011). The author, in his translation of Aristotle's extract, isolates everything from the original passage-paragraph apart the emotion of anger; the reason he does that is apparent: he refers to anger as a hot statement which from the inception of the book 'seems to present' the author's argument about emotional intelligence as valid and valued.

The author in his work relates Aristotle's passage 'of the appropriateness of demonstrating anger' (comp. p. 59) with his wider argument about emotional intelligence, which to make it believable, he says: "Were he alive today, Aristotle, so concerned with emotional skilfulness, might well approve" (p. 269). However, what we know from scholars who had delegated the philosophical meanings in Nicomachean Ethics they say that it is a book of Aristotle's Ethical Theory which is being unfolded via the topics of *happiness and its association with rational activity, that is exercised through virtues, which (virtues) are moral and acquired and reside in the intellect leading to practical wisdom, the apex of which is contemplation* (comp. Ross, 2009). Therefore, the way the author selects the above extract from Aristotle's book is misleading for his readers, to say the least, simply because anger is not the main topic of the book; it is just one example of the many Aristotle uses when he talks about exercising virtues and controlling passions. What the author writes to 'justify' Aristotle's extract as 'connected' to his argument on emotional intelligence is that he points out that: "…to rein in emotional impulse; to read another's innermost feelings; to handle relationships smoothly-As Aristotle put it, the rare skill "to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way", p. xiii, is something that Aristotle does not definitely do in his book. Aristotle does not 'select' anger for all what the author assumes… Aristotle employs anger as an example to outline it is not a virtue to be exercised, but an emotion one needs to put reins on it to control it. Aristotle in his book discusses virtues and passions in association with moderation: tempering passions, such as anger, is about moderation and moderation provides a balance between virtues and them. Virtues are the moderators that mitigate pathological demeanour and behaviour. In line therefore to the discussion in introduction, *the aim of the author is to lead his readers to accept the point that emotional reactivity drives cognitions and not the other way around; that is why we consider the author's 'explanation' to this passage as conceptual shortcoming, no. 1*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 2**

**Book extract (pp. 3-4):**

[1] At this point, let's not forget that mottos such as 'nothing in excess-μηδὲ ν ἄ γαν' and 'know thyself-γνῶ θι σαὐ τὸ ν' also incorporate the knowledge how emotions should be employed as well, especially emotions that are difficult to be managed, such as anger and fear. The above mottos were found as inscriptions in the Oracle of Delphi where Ancient Greeks used to visit to receive insights about their future from the priestess of the God Apollo, Pythia. Should they feel they needed to enter the Oracle for insights they should have experienced and practised the above mottos, otherwise insights received wouldn't be comprehensible to them.

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> "As an insight into the purpose and potency of emotions…testifies to the role of altruistic love-and every other emotion we feel-in human life. It suggests that our deepest feelings, our passions, and longings, are essential guides, and that our species owes much of its existence to their power in human affairs… Seen from the intellect, then self-sacrifice (of the parents) was arguably irrational, seen from the heart, it was the only choice to make… when it comes to shaping our decisions and our actions, feeling counts every bit as much-and often more-than thought" (pp.3-4).

The presentation of 'emotions' and 'feelings' are in this extract interchangeably employed. Emotions and feelings for the author explain the same concept. Feelings are biases that are affiliated with mental misconceptions of current reality and are generated by thinking; physical sensations generate emotions after these have been outlined via the mental faculties of the brain. The main theories associated with the above are the *facial feedback* theory: facial grimaces result to emotions and not the other way around (comp. Tomkins, 1962; Zajonc et al., 1989); the Cannon-Bard theory that physical sensations and emotion happen at the same time (comp. Cannon, 1927; Bard, 1934); the Schachter-Singer theory that events trigger physical arousals and introduce a reasoning with the process of emotions (comp. Schachter & Singer, 1962); the Richard Lazarus's cognitive appraisal theory that thinking takes place before the experience of emotions (comp. Lazarus, 1991).

The order therefore is physical sensations→mental faculties providing names to physical sensations which then are culminated to emotions→decision-making resulting from cognitive appraisals. Emotions cannot exist without logic -intelligence, in the form of a cognizant understanding (comp. Varvatsoulias, 2022). This is something psychiatrists adhere to as well, like Johnson (2005) who says that "realistic thinking is an assured casualty of this 'streamlining' approach (that supports emotions and is against cognitions)", ibid., p. 21; and he continues saying that "…rational thought is precisely what is needed to defeat an irrational emotion", ibid., p. 21. Emotions are found in the hippocampus, where memories are also found. Memories do affect emotions via mentalising and projecting their outcomes in terms of reactivity (comp. Perry et al., 2011).

The family that saved their daughter in the wheelchair (p. 3), were using their logic doing their best so that their disabled daughter to have a decent life with as much less hindrances. The fact that they saved her was the culmination of their logic -pros & cons to be saved or not automatically primed by their cognitive activity scheduling plan- for their daughter to survive regardless of the sacrifice they have put themselves into and/or the sacrifices they have done for their daughter all those years (from an evolutionary perspective, parents chose that even they knew their daughter would probably not be able to pass her genes to an offspring-s: an unconscious knowledge about life expectation and probably fertility capability could their daughter have had, would be inversely proportional due to her disability, i.e., they used their knowledge of current reality to ascertain that. Their final sacrifice was the utmost proof/evidence how much they have struggled to help her to survive regardless of any personal expense should they had to pay more for such an endeavour, that would not be paid off in case their daughter would not be able to provide an offspring. The fact that rational thought is needed more than an irrational emotion is what the parents had offered to their child, i.e., their self-sacrifice. This latter is an argument supported by CBT as well: rational thinking is the basis for helpful emotions towards proactive behaviours (comp. Frogatt, 2005). *Conceptual shortcoming no. 2: Streamlining the use of emotions more than the use of cognitions is a choice or irrational thinking that results to irrational emotion.*

**Methodological shortcoming, no. 3**

**Book extracts (pp. 4-7):**

> "…fear more powerful than love?", pp. 4-5; "…lifting up the eyebrows…", p. 7.

If that is what the author means above, does that mean that fear in his understanding governs cognitions. If so, it means we haven't moved from the reptilian brain to the brain of the homo (homo) sapiens…! 'Fear before the blinding snow so to be stopped until that passes' it means that

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the anxiety resulted from fear led to the knowledge about context relevance, i.e., cues from the environment: context and timeframe of pulling over, therefore fear, or any other emotions, is already hidden as an expression of reaction of the senses, which is asserted when using logic; otherwise it may become an impulsive reaction.

If surprise is the taking in of a larger visual sweep and permits light to strike the retina, it means it is not an emotion but a feeling, i.e., a physical sensation.




Emotional mind-rational mind: physical sensations like crying cannot prove the one is more important than the other, or that they both exist in the understanding of emotional intelligence. Crying could also be explained as a physical act of a thought that came to one's attention in the past, helping an individual realising what was that back then, which in case wasn't fully attended to, crying as a facial expression might be a trigger for such a cognitive appraisal to be fully now realised (comp. Strack et al., 1988; Varvatsoulias, 2022). *Conceptual shortcoming no. 3: Strong emotions like fear are facilitated through mentalisation on the pros and cons of a trigger and preceded via appraisals regarding the emergence of possible danger associated to it*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 4**

**Book extracts (pp. 8-12):**

> "Emotional mind as impulsive and powerful/even illogical", p. 8.
> "The more intense the feeling, the more dominant the emotional mind becomes- and the more ineffectual the rational", pp. 8-9.

Intense feeling: sensible connection with what takes place in the environment. When a feeling is described as 'intense', even such a term -following what we noted above- could be biased, therefore, the mental understanding of reality isn't clear. This is something the author doesn't acknowledge.

Emotional mind: Impulsive decision-making. Could emotional mind lead to personality disorders? We do know that impulsive decision-making is a trend we find in personality disorders (comp. Javed et al., 2022); so, if it is regarded as 'illogical', as the author says, could that mean that emotional intelligence of a mind, the decision-making of which may be impulsive, to mean that the intelligence around it is impulsive too? A rhetorical question. So far, what we discover in this book is that emotionality is a 'wrap up' of feelings, emotions, and physical sensations together, all of which build up the author's argument on emotional intelligence. Certainly, the question for us to ask is whether the author considers that 'feelings are intense', because if that's the case, the emotional mind becomes 'ineffectual' and not 'rational', e.g., unable to manage the tension demonstarted. The last part of the author's precept is contradictory. If the emotional mind isn't logical, as he says, cannot be rational at the same time (p. 8), and if the rational mind is ineffectual (pp. 8-9), the emotional mind takes over. Where is the 'rationality' of the emotional mind when 'it takes over' and where is the ineffectuality of the rational mind that 'allows that to happen'? Probably, such misunderstanding lies with the fact that the author does not regard feelings as biases of mental misrepresentations. What we can conclude from this discussion, is what the author indicates that *emotions can think*:

> "The fact that the thinking brain grew from the emotional reveals much about the relationship of thought to feeling; there was an emotional brain lag before there was a rational one", p. 10.
> And,
> "Emotional centres (have) immense power to influence the functioning of the rest of the brain-including its centres for thought", p. 12.

The author continues with his appraisal that feelings and emotions are interchangeably woven. Another claim the author doesn't explain why is that the emotional brain is seen as arousing the

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impulsive brain, which acts without thinking, triggering instinctive behaviours, and masking rational choice appearing irrational. If the author's claim is correct, does that mainly refer to primates and not to humans, since humans have cognizance which non-human animals have not? Could that also mean that we speak of emotional intelligence to non-human animals instead of humans? In CBT, we consider that emotions are generated by thinking; that is to say, when thinking or overthinking/rumination, takes place, a variety of emotions emerge to keep overthinking going. Following emotions, we can have parallel thinking to previously, which most likely is the case for emotional reasoning to make its appearance clouding our thinking by demonstrating impulsivity (comp. Berle & Moulds, 2013).

In CBT terms also, we have evidence for the opposite: behind the claim that thinking is generated by memories lies the fact that not every cognitive appraisal can be considered as real, for there are times, and we can see that in depressed clients, that the 'memory missing' is actually a false memory of an event that either didn't happen or when it happened, an individual finds difficult to recollect it fully; when the latter, takes place we have the emergence of mental misrepresentations of an event that is biased by feelings which haven't been, or not fully, experienced in the first place (comp. Berkowitz & Loftus, 2013). *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 4: Emotional mind is impulsive and irrational; its use is counter effective*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 5**

**Book extracts (pp. 17-25):**

> "…sensory signals from eye or ear travel first in the brain to the thalamus, and then-across a single synapse to the amygdala; a second signal from the thalamus is routed to the neocortex-the thinking brain. This branching allows the amygdala to begin to respond before the neocortex, which mulls information through several levels of brain's circuitry before it fully perceives and finally initiates its more finely tailored response", p. 17.

Even if that is the cause, the emotional reaction of the amygdala comes with a 'certified statement' about what to do with the issue at hand, i.e., a decision-making to act if someone is in danger. Decision-making refers to the neocortex, e.g., the thinking apparatus -the base of the faculties of the mind/brain- without which no emotional reaction could be, or would be, put into practice. I could state instead that, the thinking apparatus of the mind/brain sends signals and amygdala finely transform them into emotional reactions, counterarguing that the author's statement that "…the power of emotion (is) to overwhelm rationality" (p. 17) is not accurate.

Example to the above:

The sight of a snake signals the neocortex to release a thinking process, such as DANGER! which has to do with the immediacy to act so the status of the body not to be affected. That thinking process elicits physical sensations, such as palpitations, which then become emotional reactions, such as fear or surprise, meaning that emotions resulted would not have been elicited if the thinking utterance of DANGER wasn't present. Such as a child who has never seen a snake and tries to touch it/hold it, because the thought of DANGER hasn't been known from before, i.e., no one has explained to the child that 'we never get close to snakes because are dangerously lethal to humans', meaning that the image of a snake associated with the utterance DANGER never appeared and therefore never was stored in his brain (parietal lobes) to be associated with the same utterance and thereby to keep a distance from it. There had to be a thought in the form of a word, or a statement, so that emotional reaction to be elicited.

> "…the cognitive unconscious presents our awareness with not just the identity of what we see, but an opinion about it. Our emotions have a mind of their own; one which can hold views quite independently of our rational mind", p. 20.

What makes cognizance intelligent and not emotionality is the fact of explaining what happens; even recollecting it is still part of our cognitive/cognizant intelligence, rather than an emotional artifact.

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> "…when these emotional memories are triggered in later life, there is no matching set of articulated thought about the response that takes us over", p. 22.

Articulated thoughts are already there. They don't need emotional memories (amygdala reaction) to elicit them. They have become experiences and are automatically elicited as problem-solving options to difficult decision-making triggers, such as the route of escape when a danger is nearby. What is elicited is the 'closest escape' in cognizance terms, i.e., how one may escape at the best possible time and in the best possible manner, i.e., in using the quickest route, so to experience less possible pain, both as a physical sensation and emotional reaction.

> "Since these earliest emotional memories are established at a time before infants have words for their experience…", p. 22.

When a mother says 'DON'T' to its toddler, the boy/girl realises a likely danger in the specific execution of an action. The epithet 'dangerous' in the context of danger -that danger takes place-, the content of danger (that life can be threatened), the prior knowledge or parallel knowledge that something is dangerous, i.e., a fire in the fireplace, which someone watches from a distance and feels the heat without being burned. All the above, requires cognitions that make distinctions between felt (experiential) and known (studied) experiences of danger, which may or may not engender physical reactions of flight and/or fight when danger is or isn't at large. And cognition is the explanatory pool of information that comes out of experiences, i.e., the initial cognition that was created in the mind, with or without a physical sensation to have caused it.

The above outlines that the need to know what the danger is about, i.e., the meaning of the danger as associated with reality, and certainly not with the emotion that is pulled out, if not importance for the interpretation becomes fallible or factual truth in the mind, then we have an emotion resulting from it. A child facing the fire and trying to catch it, its mother if it catches it, she reacts with fear because the child's hand is burnt or would burn if its mother wouldn't shout at it. The 'shouting voice' of its mother introduces the thought 'don't touch it', which then passes the mother's fear onto the child therefore him/her re-experiencing it's mother's emotion the way she experienced it when it became a 'felt experience' for the child who touched or didn't touch it. The mother's voice therefore is translated to a fearful warning -a feared stimulus (trigger) elicits a cognition, which results to the emotion of fear- meaning that the child in hearing that stops -sympathetic part of the autonomous nervous system which raises fight-flight responses- conditioning the mind of the child to be negatively reinforced, if the same or similar feared stimulus comes to its attention again (comp. Watson & Tharp, 2007; Varvatsoulias, 2022). The latter explains that it may elicit the cognition of threat in a state of an assumed or real danger.

What is comprehended as 'danger' derives as an understanding by the calculated evidence of costs that may result from it. The calculated evidence is the mere knowledge of it, resulting from prior experience, i.e., the cognition of the element of danger and how this is interpreted as a 'hot term' by the mind. An action is remembered via a similar event. The thought of DON'T once recalled triggers the emotions to be repeated (fear, anger, disgust, etc.). It is not any emotional memories associated with that. Memories/recollections associate with certain statements of thoughts or terms carrying their meaning forward. An example how an emotional memory follows cognizant memory is using the term 'gift ('present' in English) and 'Gift' or 'Mitgift' ('poison' in German). The former elicits for the English-speaker the emotional memory of something good, the latter, an emotional memory, but in a differing linguistic context. When an English speaker understands that 'Gift' in German means 'poison', then even the term 'gift' in English may elicit fear or disgust: the distinction of different connotation of the same vs. different term in same or different language following a cognizant interpretation of it. Why is this happening? Because the interpretation of the term is a cognitive item; that is to say, knowing the meaning of words -key elements in perception- the emotion associated to the interpretation of it is elicited, i.e., fear or disgust, and not the other way around (Kiely, 2014; comp. Reisenzein, 2020).

A behavioural activation example on the above is the model of TRAP (triggers-response-avoidance pattern) & TRAC (trigger-response-alternative coping) in CBT terms, which replaces

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emotional intelligence with cognizant intelligence towards making useful choices and not adhering to as before (comp. Martell et al., 2001, for an overview look at pp. 105-106).

Emotions may be biased understandings of the senses, meaning they are not closer to the sensory information we receive from the environment, but to a kind of perceived threat should associate to that, such as 'the week having started with rain and one believing that it is going to last for more than seven days and feeling sad about it...'. The author seems not to make a distinction between the seat of emotions and the cognitive abilities that govern the emotions, even when he admits that the prefrontal cortex controls feelings. In the author's vocabulary, 'feelings' like fear and rage are also emotions (comp. pp. 24-25), when feelings are comprehended outcomes of our cognitive experience, in the way these are aroused, according to our contact with the senses and the concepts deriving from them as appraisals in our mind. That could be a good argument if the author was to expand more on it.

> "Ordinarily, the prefrontal areas govern our emotional reactions from the start", p. 25.
>
> "The largest projection of sensory information…goes not the amygdala, but to the neocortex … making sense of what is being perceived…, (which) is coordinated by the prefrontal lobes, the seat of planning and organizing actions…", p. 25.

What the author assumed before about the prefrontal part seems to change it now by contradicting it to his initial hypothesis that amygdala is the centre of the emotional brain. We know that sensory information leads to emotions, however, the author alters his prior argument. The latter means that once frontal/prefrontal lobes are the executive part of the brain (comp. Otero, & Barker, 2014), it means that emotions having been interpreted, are executed, and become cognizant patterns, which then affect the degree emotions are activated. The author seems to give credit to the latter. He further asserts that by writing:

> "Just as with the amygdala, absent the workings of prefrontal lobes, much of emotional life would fall away", p. 25.

…meaning that emotional intelligence is not the case, but that of an intelligible intelligence instead. That doesn't mean that emotions don't play a part in the establishment of emotional reaction or reactance, but that without cognitions, emotions cannot be established. The contradiction here lies with the fact that the author so far was arguing that the amygdala had the upper hand in the emotional intelligence and not the prefrontal cortex, i.e., the seat of the cognitive abilities, whereas now outlines the opposite... *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 5: The misconception between feelings and emotions as interchangeably presented leads to a contradicted understanding between the role of the amygdala and the role of the prefrontal cortex*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 6**

**Book extracts (pp. 33-46):**

> "Academic intelligence has little to do with emotional life. The brightest among us can founder on the shoals of unbridled passions and unruly impulses; people with high IQs can be stunningly poor pilots of their private lives", pp. 33-34.

The author in attempting to build up his emotional intelligence argument, employs an incident between a student and his tutor to conclude that irrationality doesn't play with emotional life. For the author emotional life is totally unconnected to cognitive life. However, the incident itself proves something totally different: the student's behaviour who stabbed his tutor at school due to bad grades, was because he was experiencing disastrous cognitive effects of not having the grades which would allow him to be accepted at Harvard university. His low self-esteem was the trigger - *cognitive dissociation from current reality giving rise to biased feelings, which compensated the focus on achieving a better grade next time and having focused on catastrophising instead, he elaborated it and then anger emerged*- that led him go berserk and stab his teacher. The student wasn't asked at Court -a work by a psychologist-expert witness- what were his internal

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physiological motives when he learnt that his grade wasn't as expected, so an explanation to his anger to be sought for.

> "…emotional intelligence: abilities such as being able to motivate oneself persist in the face of frustrations; to control impulses and delay gratification; to regulate one's moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think, to empathise and to hope", p. 34.

The verbs, nouns, and phrases underlined above, explain the cognizant part of intelligence before the elicitation of emotional reactions, and do not support emotional intelligence This extract is a clear CBT example how cognitions work in theory and practice, and if we were to relate it to the incident it could be a fair statement how one can restructure one's mind (comp. Clark, 2014):

1. Motivate: intended initiative.
2. Persist: firmness on the decision taken.
3. Frustrations: emotional reactance.
4. Control: use of pros and cons.
5. Delay: consideration of changes.
6. Regulate: bringing up a balance.
7. Keep: holding onto.
8. From swamping the ability to think: exercising a benefits and costs analysis, meaning a proactive action following proactive thinking.
9. Empathise: coming to terms with the possibility of an unwanted outcome (comp. Bloom, 2016).
10. Hope: scheduling a goal.

> "The predominant models among cognitive scientists of how the mind processes information have lacked an acknowledgement that rationality is guided by-and can be swamped by-feeling…the higher values of the human heart-faith, hope, devotion, love-are missing entirely from the coldly cognitive vie", p. 41.

The author continues the same pattern by calling/equalling feelings to emotions and vice versa and by sweeping off cognitions for the sake of emotions. Cognitive theorists have never considered anything of the above missing at the expense of the other. The interpretation they provide do have to do with cognitive antecedents behind those emotions, so them to be experienced having gone through the thinking of their usefulness, the context taking place, the content for people experiencing them, the outcome when these become pragmatic. Emotions are not instinctive reactions regardless if they are seen as such by the author in many of the pages of his book - evolutionary psychological interpretation to inclusive fitness and the role of genes, group selection choices for the betterment of society, altruistic behaviours, the meaning of sacrifice as an action, are some of the practical examples the above emotions refer to, i.e., the cognitions behind, which have precipitated them (comp. Sober & Sloan Wilson, 1998; comp. Varvatsoulias, G. 2013; comp. Varvatsoulias, 2014). In order these to be experienced in the form of emotions too, the executive part of the brain is needed to take the lead so these to take place for the benefit of those in need or those expressing/demonstrating them.

> "Metacognition: intrapersonal intelligence of emotions", p. 41.

By metacognition/awareness, we mean what thoughts as representations of current reality mean in the human mind. It is not just the actual thought that is generated, but the content of the thought in association with the workings of that in one's mind, which 'export' such thought, such as the degree of perception involved, the conscious commitment to that perception, and the action it entails (comp. Hasselhorn & Labuhn, 2011). In order for metacognition/awareness to generate emotions, it is needed the understanding of the physical outcome of sensations, when these thoughts explain cues from the environment, the impact they have, the relevant emotions they produce (comp. Papaleontiou-Louca, 2003); for instance, an infectious disease that affected members of the public with physical sensations may be that one feels heart palpitations or becomes sweaty, when walking among 'potential agents' carrying the infection, generating thus fear -emotion- which to be

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counterbalanced one may engage in ritualistically repetitive behaviours, such as washing hands excessively. Now, where, and how the author considers metacognition as a post for intrapersonal intelligence of emotions, doesn't clarify it clearly; he just uses arguments set by Gardner and Salovey. The latter author especially seems to disagree with our author; however, we don't see a counterargument to Salovey's tenet:

> "Salovey subsumes Gardner's personal intelligences in his basic definitions of emotional intelligence, expanding these abilities into five main domains" (comp. Salovey & Mayer, 1990): (1) knowing one's emotions, (2) managing emotions, (3) motivating oneself, (4) recognising emotions in others, (5) handling relationships", pp. 43-44.

All five areas by Salovey & Mayer are metacognitions for they are outlining not only the awareness of one's own mental processes, but those of others too -a parallel theory of mind in a sense-, e.g., we understand that someone is sad or unhappy because of the external representations of these emotions on the level of physical sensations, such as moodiness, fatigue, etc., and then we relate them to -possible- emotions being entailed by. Physical sensations -may- outcome to cognitions which then give rise to relevant emotions, as the above in the example, for cognitions could result from triggers, such as redundancy, workplace stressors, conflicting relationships and the like or like them (comp. Sabbagh & Bowman 2018).

I also think that something else the author does not explain in his book is his understanding of IQ. IQ is not expressed as a major tenet in cognitive science. IQ is used as a technical term for cleverness, and is not something that has to do with human cognition, e.g., with an 'established rationale' as to how the human cognition 'should appear to be' and/or what 'causes the formation' of it. IQ is a metaphor comparing same skills among different people; it is not something that 'defines' who is 'clever' and who is not! -For a technical paper on IQ, please look at Matzel & Sauce (2017). In cognitive theory/psychology/psychotherapy, cognitions explain/represent reactions we outcome to from triggers from the environment, whether these reactions are useful or not. Thoughts are contemplative acts of choice which assist us to survive with less possible costs.

> "Socrates' injunction "Know thyself" speaks to the keystone of emotional intelligence: awareness of one's own feelings as they occur", p. 46.

"Know thyself" is not an emotionally intelligent principle or statement, but a precept indicating that if someone is governed by emotions, failing to accept cognitive processes of self-knowledge -i.e., experiential knowledge about the self-, then the emotions that are produced can easily link or result to impulsive/compulsive actions. The author refers only to the "Know thyself", however he doesn't continue with the rest of that precept which is about "nothing in excess". The latter explains that self-knowledge to be complete, there is needed impulsivity to be kept at a minimum. We argue that emotions are based on cognitions and not the other way around. Emotions being governed by cognitions do "nothing in excess" -see more on *know thyself* and *nothing in excess* on note 1. The other way around -cognitions being governed by emotions- stipulate the "know thyself" as a goal and not as a means. "Know thyself" as a means leads to notions outlining their internal concepts about what they are using as external representations, like terms, such as 'rain' (term of a sensed representation) and 'wetness' (where rain is leading to, conceptually). In this way, terms first and notions following, build up education, learning, and knowing (comp. Fisher, 2015; comp. Editorial, 2021). In CBT terms, knowing thyself is part of psychoeducational knowledge and cognitive restructuring process in line with self-awareness, distancing and katharsis (comp. Robertson, 2010; comp. Leder, 2017). *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 6: The meaning of emotions as intelligences and intelligence as a counterpart of emotional life, metacognitions and self-knowledge included*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 7**

**Book extracts (pp. 48-55):**

> "When they get into a bad mood, they don't ruminate and obsess about it, and are able to get out of it sooner", p. 48.

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In this extract, the author refers to the outcome of cognitions: false representation of a situation that leads to negative appraisals. What is though contradictory in that is his claim that ruminative thinking is not affected by bad mood; even the adjective 'bad' indicates that rumination cannot only begotten over it -the bad mood- but that also prevails over it -the bad mood (comp. Ehring & Elhers, 2014).

The question on the above extract is what is the cognitive-behavioural apparatus of the above?

a. "Getting into bad mood" → it needs a trigger to have a response as such; could be an event or a thought process -most likely, is a thought process, because there are representations of ideas how one should think if things don't go as planned/expected, therefore the 'getting into a bad mood', meaning is a present continuous reaction to most of triggers (comp. Westbrook et al., 2007/2009).
b. The response of ruminations of that or the intrusiveness of thinking of it in a vicious circle reaction is what gives rise to physical sensations (feelings) and emotions followed by avoidant behaviours, such as isolation (comp. Visser et al., 2020).

And he continues:

> "In short, their mindfulness helps them manage their emotions", p. 48.

What is meant by "mindfulness", is the mental awareness of thought processes, which result to feelings, emotions, and avoidant patterns responses. Mindfulness is not about emotional intelligence: it is the meta-intelligence of cognitions which have become intelligible. Mindfulness could also be understood as operating through contemplation -an advanced level of metacognitive experience (comp. Kudesia, 2019).

On page 49, the author makes mention of "attentional stances" (attitudes) leading to distress and relevant consequences. What is not stressed here is the understanding of attentional bias that is based not on the information people become witnesses there and then, but on the memory of information which after had been stored in the brain, it operates as a flashcard to relevant others, or similar ones, that emerge and bring about the same thinking once was attended to. Therefore, it refers to a bias out of a stored attention that was employed in the past for survival purposes (comp. Shabbir et al., 2018). That comes up again to restore faith against selection pressures which challenge the need for adaptation before adaptive threats, such as the turbulences hitting a plane flying over the Rocky Mountains, as the author denotes on p. 49. The same attentional bias would be in place if instead the Rockies were the Alps, or if just the word 'mountain' would come to the pilot's mouth or to any of passengers' thoughts. However, one other thing that the author does not explain is whether the same attentional bias would be if the word 'Rocky Mountains' would sound in a language other than English to the same plane passengers. For instance, if in a native language the same announcement was to be made and one has heard of it would one feel the same symptoms of panic as if one's attention was in English alone?

In other words, what introduces and establishes attentional biases, and other biases, is the knowledge of the language construction the concept is expressed. The lack of knowledge of the language construction in the very same concepts results to a totally different outcome, i.e., the audience doesn't get panicky when hearing the concept on the meaning of which they are biased about. And what does we mean by 'language', 'knowledge', 'concept'? We mean cognitions coming together to provide explanation on certain matters either or reality, or even, unreality! The lack of knowledge of other languages does not elicit attentional bias unless people are able to communicate in them. Attentional bias from a CBT perspective relates to emotional disorders, such as anxiety and depression, which exhibit mood-congruence on the memory of the information recalled (comp. MacLeod et al., 1986).

> Meaning of alexithymia (in the book, pp. 50-51): "…difficulty describing feelings-their own or anyone else's-and a sharply limited emotional vocabulary".

In a CBT perspective alexithymia means overprotecting the irascible part of the brain, i.e., the impulsive side of cognitions, which operate without them to have been tackled prior to expressing them. In tackling impulsive cognitions their meaning receives a clear understanding before

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demonstration of them as actions. Alexithymia can be managed via mindfulness and cognitive restructuring (comp. Norman et al., 2019). The irascible part takes us back to the reptilian brain where actions take place instinctively, for they are not associated with the intellectual part to question/reflect on if an action is good to be executed or not (comp. Zemelka, 2018). The irascible -impulsivity- opens the 'Pandora's box' of the appetitive part, i.e., the desirable one where unreasonable demand and wishes may emerge. If we were to try a mapping on alexithymia, that would show as follows:




In the paragraph "In praise of gut feeling" (pp. 52-54), the author associates the lack of emotional intelligence with the fact that removal of a tumour behind a patient's forehead led to the destruction of emotions. The truth, though, is totally the opposite. The removal of the tumour since has also led to the removal of some of the thinking abilities of the neocortex, the question should have been asked would be whether ties with the amygdala had them been severed, would the patient be able to make emotional connections to triggers from the environment? In other words, to have emotional awareness in his relation to the environment -the patient wasn't able to make such connections. The whole paragraph is composed around the severed ties between the damaged thinking processes of the neocortex and the amygdala, with the latter to be most important than the former -i.e., the severe ties with parts of cognitive faculties-, such as making a distinction between ideas of no importance and ideas of importance, such as paying bills, finding a job, making good use of money, keeping good communication with others, listening to what others have to say and not only wishing to be listened to, etc.; these could some of the derivatives should severed ties between the neocortex and the amygdala had emerged in that patient.

In such facets of the life of the patient, the patient couldn't perform, meaning he lacked mental awareness of reality which led to lacking emotional awareness too, because what was missing was a 'cognitive-developmental approach to that case towards enhancing emotional awareness that could bridge the gap between normal and abnormal emotional states' (comp. Lane & Schwartz 1987). The 'answer' the author 'provides' is: "the key to sounder personal decision-making, in short: being tuned to our feelings" (meaning 'emotions'), p. 54, which lacks understanding with regards to what we outlined above about mental awareness; such kind of an explanation is of no worth in the context it is presented by the author'; it is just emotional awareness 'encapsulating' emotions, thoughts, behaviours, with mental awareness to be in the background or just a 'by-product' to the former. *Conceptual shortcoming no. 7: Memory of information as related to emotional intelligence and not to cognitive appraisals; decision-making as dependant on emotional tuning of the memory of information; emotional tuning as justifying the existence of the memory of information.*

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 8**

**Book extracts (pp. (20)55-61):**

The outcome of the above is that the author believes that what we call 'unconscious' is the presence of emotional awareness in what he points out as:

> "…emotions that simmer beneath the threshold of awareness can have a powerful impact on how we perceive and react", p. 55.

What the author hadn't taken into consideration is the work that has been done on the cognitive unconscious, which the author admits it, as we discuss it here, but also rejects it at the same time:

> "…the cognitive unconscious" presents our awareness with not just the identity of what we see, but an opinion about it" [p. 20 -taken from Bargh, (1994).

What the author says after that is:

> "Our emotions have a mind of their own, one which can hold views quite independently of our rational mind", p. 20.

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This is contradictory to what the author admitted before. When he notes "…an opinion about it" he clearly points to the direction that the cognitive unconscious is part of our mental (cognitive) awareness and not of our emotional one; it may include emotions following cognitions, but thoughts are which regulate it. Important paper to read on cognitive unconscious is by Reber (1992).

> "Sophrosyne (Σωφροσύνη, a Greek term), a sense of self-mastery, care and intelligence in conducting one's life", p. 56.

This is a peripheral understanding of σωφροσύνη. If we would like to offer an exact translation to it, we would prefer the one explaining it as 'having a safe mind' (σώας φρένας, etymological stem in Greek), which indicates that one who has it is able to contemplate, not just think about it. If

> "…the Romans and the early Christian Church called it temperantia", p. 56,

then, it is incorrect because it is not what means in Greek. What the author means, probably, is the meaning of it in Western Christianity and therefore philosophy, where the language was Latin, not the Eastern Christianity where the language was Greek. Also, what the author explains as 'sophrosyne'

> "a tempered balance and wisdom", p. 56,

is not what σῶας τὰς φρένας (σωφροσύνη) means. It could mean the former as an outcome, once the latter is in place, i.e., a safe mind that is able to provide balance and wisdom; this is what is provided by a safe mind and not by emotions towards

> "…the restraining of emotional success", *or* "emotional suppression", p. 56.
>
> *The* "appropriate emotions, feeling proportionate to circumstance", p. 56,

is not 'an emotional success' but a success of the mind which by the use of its cognitive facultie of it can regulate emotional suppression/unrestrained emotions, and not the other way around. Σωφροσύνη→σῶον φρόνημα (safe demeanour)→σώας φρένας against ἀφροσύνη (thoughtlessness); σωφροσύνη, is actually about prudence (safe mind), and moderation in terms of enabling in a good use one's demeanour, because of the soundness of the mind and discreet thinking -a cognitive restructuring process in CBT terms with a philosophical inquiry-, which is quite the opposite meaning to what the author presents as an understanding of σωφροσύνη (sophrosyne). Αἰδὼς, σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία-Shame begetteth modesty (literally: Shame, shares more with prudence), and valour is most sensible of shame (literally: dishonour, shares more with good courage), comp. *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, chapter 1: 84§ 3* -the translation outside the brackets was taken by the Perseus Project on 23/11/2022 retrieved from the website https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/-hopper/text?doc=Thuc.%-20%201.%2084&lang=original]. One thing I was trying to understand from studying this book, is why the author provides an example with an indication of a feeling and presents it as an emotion, such as one waking from sleep after someone had beeped him (p. 57). Where is here the emotion deriving from the fact that one was woken? To be "in some mood or other", p. 57, as the author states? And how can that be justified as an emotion? I wonder what happened to Pavlov's experiment as a form of familiarising one with conditional learning responses, for it is the thought that reminds the emotion that once had taken place, not the opposite.

> "…a young man who told of working up his anger to help his little brother with playground bullies", p. 58.

In his presentation of "bad moods" (p. 58), the author makes mention of some examples, as the above. The 'workings of anger' were 'played out' and did not result from the big brother's emotionality before immediate threat. It was a kind of a lesson he wanted to show to his little brother to learn how to deal with playground bullies. It was not a real emotion; it was a made-up emotion for demonstration purposes, which the big brother conceptualised it at first and then he exhibited it to his little brother. What was conceptualised as anger was the threat his little brother had experienced so to provide him with a problem-solving intervention as to alternating the problem via a useful solution. That solution to had been conceptualised there was the need to come up via a decision-making process, in which the element of threat had to be deconstructed through the logicality of an emotion (anger) which would be the outcome of a certain decision how the problem

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could be solved. It simply had nothing to do with the emotional intelligence of the big brother. The big brother was just showing how his little one could be behaviourally activated via a useful decision-making so to develop anger as problem-solving. The correct order thoughts→physical sensations→emotions are presented by the author in the first time in the lines of his book and is presented in the first paragraph of the part titled "The anatomy of rage", p. 59. That is a good example about what we have commented on so far. The question is why the author didn't do that earlier, but after 50 pages or so? CBT would agree with the author in such an analysis (comp. Fenn & Byrne, 2013), though in the development of his book that doesn't last for long.

"Anger Builds on Anger" -paragraph on p. 61.

One that isn't clear with the presentation of emotions by the author, as in this paragraph, is whether he accepts that emotions are built upon certain thought outcomes following a certain event that triggers them first as physical sensations (trembling, nervousness, palpitations, symptoms of panic, etc.) and then as emotional reactions resulting to certain actions. The author, though he seems he doesn't accept that the basis of emotions is a particular thinking preceding them, or cognitive clusters pertaining them, he admittedly 'posts them' as outcomes of an intelligence that is within an emotional framework, meaning that cognitions are artifacts of them (the emotions) and not the other way around, i.e., emotions as artifacts of thought processes.

> "…every successive anger-provoking thought or perception becomes a mini-trigger for amygdala-driven surges of catecholamines…", p. 61.

In a paper by Mirolli et al. (2010), the authors outline that "…amygdala contributes to regulate the body states via the sympathetic, parasympathetic and hormonal systems", p. 232. According to their statement it shows that the amygdala triggers physical sensations in the body which are effectuated by events and experiences in the here-and-now. Or, in another extract of the same publication we read: "…and in the regulation of three high-level cognitive processes (namely, the affective labelling of memories, the production of goal-directed behaviours, and the performance of planning and complex decision making)", p. 215. In the same paper it reads that the amygdala also play a significant role "…in the regulation of the three fundamental classes of affective responses (namely, the regulation of body states, the regulation of brain states via neuromodulators, and the triggering of a number of basic behaviours fundamental for adaptation…", ibid, which according, again, to the authors, it is not exhaustive to the 'affective responses', but first and foremostly to the various high-level decision-making processes that are responsible for the affective responses. Relevant important information and evidence-based research for the role of the amygdala on decision-making can be found also in the papers by: Bechara et al. (2003) and Gupta et al. (2011), where the authors write: "decision-making is believed to involve areas of the brain involved in emotion (e.g., amygdala…)", p. 760, meaning that decision-making involves the role of amygdala versus otherwise. We also know that the striatum part in the basal ganglia is the make-up of the inner core of the brain which processes decision-making (comp. Balleine et al., 2007). Finally, we are also aware that decision-making is also initiated in the orbitofrontal cortex (comp. Wallis, 2007). Both the striatum and the amygdala convey decision-making processes to the prefrontal cortex, where researchers, such as Goulet-Kennedy et al. (2016) and Wassum (2022), consider that cognitions are initiated and executed in line with decisions that were made to support them before these are translated into certain emotions and become certain actions (comp. also Otero & Barker, 2014, and Bruine de Bruine et al., 2020).

It is noteworthy to add that in the paper above by Wassum (2022), it is also stated that thus far amygdala was regarded as the centre of emotional reactivity, however studies have shown that it is one of the main parts of the brain that decision-making takes also place re-evaluating the clinical knowledge we had from before -including 1996 where Goleman's book was published- that they are the nucleus of emotions. Emotional intelligence makes people thinking through their emotions, i.e., impulsively, and not through their cognitions, i.e., intelligibly. In that sense, impulsive thinking being generated by emotional intelligence may affect cognitions negatively and to therefore lead to impulsive actions (comp. Frijda et al., 2014).

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Starting from the consideration of anger by the author and the examples he uses on impulsive emotional reactivity throughout his book, emotional intelligence is justified as an impulsive behavioural action that may also lead to destruction. *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 8: Partial scientific inquiry on the role of the lobes of the brain leads to assumptions of a one-sided 'importance' that amygdala govern and generate emotional reactivity towards the precipitation of cognitions. Lessons from philosophy haven't been regarded as parallel for the scientific inquiry on the matter.*

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 9**

**Book extracts (pp. 61-103):**

When anger/emotions are being governed by emotionality:

> "…rage, unhampered by reason, easily erupts in violence", p. 61. "At this point people are unforgiving and beyond being reasoned with; their thoughts revolve around revenge and reprisal, oblivious to what the consequences may be…failing cognitive guidance…". P. 62.

This is a subtle acknowledgment by the author that by attending to the responses of (wild) or not -I would add- emotions, impulsivity takes place for emotions failed to receive cognitive guidance. I think this is a blunt admission to the fact that not 'listening to the cognitive process of emotions, emotionality may be established with dreadful results for the individual(s) concerned and, of course, others around them.

And he continues:

> To "…defusing anger is to seize on and challenge the thoughts that trigger the surges of anger and the subsequent reappraisals that form the flames", p. 62.

–another statement, why emotional intelligence fails or should fail, so not impulsive reactions to take place is by de-escalating impulsivity via cognitive guidance. Retaliation recedes, impulsivity is controlled, cognitive appraisals of thoughtful decisions take over. As crudely as the author puts it, as much inconsequential he considers it when he comes to challenge his thesis on emotional intelligence! De-escalating emotional hear-up (cooling off) is part of the reasoning process of the pros and cons for the continuation or not of impulsivity. Not taking place, intelligence is 'handed over' to emotions and disaster is fulfilled. Another term, the author uses, incomprehensibly is that of "catharsis" (p. 64) -somehow, he touches upon it, but not exactly (comp. Mallick & McCandless, 1996). Catharsis is not the venting out of difficult emotions -as the author argues-, such as anger and rage, but that of an innermost balance in terms of reasoning and good frame of mind, even if triggers show otherwise, i.e., feeling good not to vent out by emotion and impulsive reactivity. Catharsis (κάθαρσις) is about the experience of inner purification against what keeps an individual alienated from oneself and therefore from others. It is the problem-solving process that cleans up everything -according to the etymology of this term in Greek-, and not what is implicated as a substitute of one foul emotion with another, or even an expression that is verbally demonstrated, instead of being positively acted upon it with reason. When there is catharsis taken place, cleaning up of all the system of emotional impulsivity renders emotional intelligence an intelligible emotional reaction. In CBT terms, this is again about cognitive restructuring as well as the cognitive meaning of reality instead of ruminative thinking that is about emotionally driven expectations (comp. Larsson, et al., 2016).

On pages 65-77, where the author discusses worry, melancholy, major depression, and ruminative thinking, the presence of emotional intelligence explanation isn't there. He seems to be accepting the role of cognitive elements in worrisome thinking and the somatic, physical impact they present as sensations of anxiety. He doesn't explain the absence of emotional intelligence in those pages, and he makes presentations of symptoms and/or disorders, according to a cognitive-behavioural rationale -though he doesn't call it as such. He also suggests interpretations, such as exercise, for behavioural activation, to outline how behavioural changes can act upon depressive experiences (pp. 76-77) wishing thus to provide a new understanding to how upsetting information may give rise to depressive symptoms.

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> "When emotions overwhelm concentration, what is being swamped is the mental capacity cognitive scientists call 'working memory', the ability to hold in mind all information relevant to the task at hand", p, 79.

In cognitive psychology books the above argument regarding "the working memory as a mental capacity" would sound like a piecemeal approach. Working memory is that what we call short-term memory, contrasted to long-term memory. Long-term memory is the 'storage place' of memories unnoticed but existing in one's mind, that cannot be easily recalled from their 'storehouses'. Short-term memory is the everyday working memory with regards to speaking, communicating, recognising, remembering roads, plans, setting new objectives, connecting ourselves with the here-and-now. The mental capacity of the working memory is associated with the capacity to employ information known already, updating it, re-planning it and use it procedurally and episodically - most cognitive psychology books provide examples how working memory -short-term memory- functions in the here-and-now. Comp. Quinlan & Dyson (2008).

On page 81, the author discusses social competence as a learning process in the life of individuals, yet again he doesn't comment on it according to an emotional intelligence rationale/explanation. On pages 86-90, the author presents and discusses optimism and hope via examples, such as the Pandora's Box. The way an understanding triggers is the main topic in those pages outlining that optimism and hope can provide one with positive thinking. Again, he doesn't compare the above terms (optimism and hope) with emotional intelligence or doesn't argue whether the former is outcome of the latter or vice versa.

On pages 90-95, the author discusses the "flow/ecstatic moments" people experience in their lives, which to his account relate to emotional intelligence reactions/presentations. "…mastery in a craft or skill is spurred on by the experience of flow…", p. 93. It is a process of motivation as the author argues so one to stay in the course advancing the experience of flow. Though, the author, indicates it, he doesn't nevertheless clearly outline if the flow process is all that is required one's emotions to be through learning. He does imply, however, that has to do with emotional intelligence for the meaning of flow and the adherence of people at it, is because it provides ecstatic moments which operate as reminders so that the experience of flow to get further advanced when it is continually addressed to. Another explanation the author doesn't entertain is that the experience of 'flow', and of 'ecstatic moments', relate to physical sensations that have to do with the autonomous nervous system (sympathetic-parasympathetic) and not so much with any emotional intelligence adherents; it is basically -the flow/ecstatic moments- physiological reactions due to hormonal and/or alternate changes in the flow of neurotransmitters from neuron to neuron (comp. Chu et al., 2022).

On the other hand, on chapter 7, we have a problematic presentation of the term empathy. We are not going to deconstruct each page individually; only, we will refer to the subsection of 'how empathy unfolds' where we see the author to have made a translational error between the terms *empatheia* and *empathy*.

> The roots of empathy (chapter 7, pp. 96-98);
> 'How empathy unfolds' (pp. 98-99): "…motor mimicry…is the original technical sense of the word empathy…This sense is slightly different from its original introduction into English from the Greek empatheia, "feeling into", a term used initially by theoreticians of aesthetics for the ability to perceive the subjective experience of another person", p. 98,
> 'The well-attuned child' (pp. 99-101);
> The costs of misattunement' (pp. 101-102);
> 'The neurology of empathy' (pp. 102-104): 'The neurological connection of empathy to the amygdala (p.103), explains that term as an emotional expression 'felt into' one's mind regarding what someone suffers from' -summary of the named page.

It would suffice also to say that, on page 103, the author makes the 'connection' of amygdala to 'empathy', according to studies conducted on rhesus monkeys…(!?).

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The author shows ignorance in knowing and understanding what the term *empatheia* means in Greek. The Greek word *empatheia-ἐμπάθεια*, where the English transliteration 'empathy' comes from, means something totally different in Greek. *Empatheia* does not mean 'feeling into', but on the contrary *'I have no good thoughts for someone'* as thoughts relate to pathological cognitions and emotions against someone, meaning also that one who demonstrates them, one is not sympathetic towards someone; one even can be against towards another via hatred, rancour, retribution, revenge, let alone meaning also that no physical affection or likeness can be present. The meaning of empathy, as deriving from the Greek *empatheia*, defines only a transliterated and not a conceptual connection between these two terms. A parallel example -which we have used in previous pages- is that of the word 'gift' in English, which means 'present', and the word 'Gift' in German, or 'Mitgift', which means 'poison' in English. To use a pun expression here: '*Your empatheia is not empathetic because it is mean; or if I like your 'gift', but not your 'Gift', it means I prefer to have a 'gift' with lower case 'g', for the upper case 'G' is not a 'gift' for me'*. Transliteration of words from Greek to English, do not always 'affiliate' to the concepts these are referring to etymologically. There is too much conceptual confusion with the term empathy regarding how much that needs to be cognitive (not absorbing the negative emotions of others) and how much that needs to be emotional (responding with appropriate emotion to one's clinical state) (comp. Bloom, P. 2016).

The author continues the same page (103) by writing about how emotions may appear through faces (an example he uses again from rhesus monkeys), however he doesn't refer to humans whether primarily emotions through faces have a neurocognitive basis, i.e., a neuro-cortical foundation which could associate cognitions with emotions and not the other way around. Another explanation how amygdala modulate emotion reaction can be found in Deak (2011), who says, that "…amygdala might influence cognition by modulating sensory thresholds that regulate both information processing and guiding the organism's attention to the emotionally relevant stimuli", p. 75; comp. Varvatsoulias (2022). *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 9: Use of cognitive psychological evidence partially to what they mean and psychotherapeutic terms outside their remit of use in psychological therapy*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 10**

**Book extracts (pp. 104-136):**

> Empathy and Ethics: The roots of altruism (pp. 104-106): "…the opposite of empathy is antipathy", p. 105.

The author doesn't explain/conceptualise what antipathy means (another Greek term), deriving from the stem word to the host word. The latter can lead into conceptual confusion, as in the case of the author explaining the term 'empathy'. The former doesn't outline the integrative content the stem word is carrying and its significance to the meaning that is ascribed to. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, antipathy means a strong opposition and dislike or anger. Though not identical, *antipathy* is closely to *empatheia*, rather than the latter to *empathy*. The author doesn't identify the close connection between *empatheia* and *antipathy*. *Antipathy* is parallel to the Greek term *empatheia* and not as the latter is transliterated to *empathy*. Empathy means 'acknowledging the emotional turmoil of another'; antipathy means 'happiness over the emotional hardships (something analogous to spite) and life upheavals of another'.

> Life without empathy: The mind of the molester, the morals of the sociopath (pp. 106-110).

In the chapter on empathy, the author uses examples to differentiate empathy from what it is not. He connects it with the amygdala and the visual cortex; however, he says nothing whether next to the emotional empathy could be found cognitive empathy as well and which precedes the other -see above, Bloom's book. The making of the case for emotional intelligence by the author doesn't identify it clearly in terms also of its neural connection: *emotions* can be associated to amygdala (Domínguez-Borràs & Vuilleumier, 2022), but is it the same with *intelligence*? In theory, which is regarded a supposition without clear empirical findings, cognitive and emotional intelligence are

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prefrontal and limbic respectively (p. 265) -the author's name is one of the writers who does the latter. However, decision-making -which is more important as a neuroscientific substrate to cognitive intelligence, offering outgrowth to the latter as a conceptual understanding to realising the meaning of the former- is found to be in the orbitofrontal cortex and indeed as an outcome of bodily signals (comp. Nauta, 1971) and somatic markers (comp. Damasio, 1996) (p. 268), i.e., triggers and events which are comprehended and established via the five senses (comp. Barbey et al., 2014), which are postulates also in cognitive-behavioural therapy research. The author in continuing the lack of empirical findings, implies that emotional intelligence appears as a cognitive affect, the basis of which is the amygdala, but he doesn't explore how amygdala relate to the cognitive faculties of the mind. It seems that the author 'neglects' the cognitive faculties of the mind, whilst associates amygdala as the source for emotional empathy, which, for him, reads far greater and important from cognitive faculties assuming the latter presented as outcomes of the function of the amygdala (!?).

One by reading Goleman's book and indexing it, if one were to be asked what they have learnt what emotional intelligence is about, one could not be sure what answer to give. The reason is that neither 'emotional' nor 'intelligence' are clearly answered in this book as to what they really represent as concepts. The book is full of examples of everyday life which 'attempt' to provide a 'pragmatic comprehension' to this term which in the end proves not to be intuitive or tuned into a conceptual hypothesis the author wishes to present it, i.e., how the concept of emotional intelligence aligns with pragmatic experiences one acquires in life, be them one's own or someone else's.

To give an example of such 'pragmatic comprehension', on page 131 the author writes:

> "When girls play together, they do so in small, intimate groups, with an emphasis on minimising hostility and maximising cooperation, while boys' games are in larger groups, with an emphasis on competition".

My question is: Are boys only prone to competitive activities and not girls? What about the 'choosy females' adaptation in human evolution, where girls compete into finding or winning over best mates compared to their sex-conspecifics (comp. DeSantis, 2021)? Or, what about maximising hostility and reducing cooperation for the sake of getting hold more of the resources in each environment -again from an evolutionary point of view (comp. Junikka, 2018)? Or could boys by minimising hostility and maximising cooperation to ease out competition and promote cooperation for a greater good -for instance, altruism or group affiliation against social conflict to promote group cohesion [comp. Sober & Sloan Wilson (1998)? The author referred to 'boys' games': In many of girls' and boys' games, referees are also present, regardless of the degree of competition between them.

Their effort is to minimise social conflict/hostility and maximise cooperation, so the game to be in balance. Teams of both boys' squads should they attune to that, it means they take into consideration that for a winner to be finalised, they need to minimise hostility, so cooperation within their teams to maximise the effort undertaken to win the game; in other words, a within-group adaptation selected for so hostility to be reduced. On the other hand, in group-selection terms, competition and cooperation may be referred to interchangeably, i.e., combination of both so that maximisation of the effort of a team to be succeeded. If the latter is correct, it means the argument introduced by the author isn't exactly true.

The same -almost- argument could apply to what the author says in the end of pages 131-132 that:

> "This difference between boys and girls at play epitomises what Harvard's Carol Gilligan points to as a key disparity between the sexes: boys take pride in a lone, toughminded independence and autonomy, while girls see themselves as part of a web of connectedness. Thus boys are threatened by anything that might challenge their independence, while girls are more threatened by a rupture in their relationships".

Question: Could the latter and the former work in cooperation and not in competition? Carol Gilligan, a known feminist was a colleague to Laurence Kohlberg with whom they wrote the stages

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of moral development, which then she denounced saying they were male-oriented, meaning they couldn't be generalised to females. I wonder if she could say the same for boys, i.e., that her theory is female-oriented and cannot be generalised to males. In Gilligan (2011), she writes: "I entered the conversation about women and morality in the late 1960s, a time in the U.S. that witnessed a convergence of the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the movement to stop atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, the movement to end poverty, the women's movement, and the gay liberation movement. I was teaching at Harvard with Eric Erikson, a psychoanalyst working in the Freudian tradition, and Lawrence Kohlberg, a cognitive developmental psychologist working in the tradition of Piaget. To all those men – Freud and Erikson, Piaget, and Kohlberg- women appeared deficient in development".

Question: Could it be possible, Gilligan's argument, mentioned by Goleman, to depict her ideas as these are presented in this extract? In another extract: "Gilligan's book traces love's path as she studies children's communication and couples in crisis and argues persuasively that a child's inborn ability to love freely and live authentically becomes inhibited by patriarchal structure. Gilligan demonstrates how parents and patriarchal culture reinforces the loss of voice in girls while simultaneously forcing and slamming sons into masculine behavior characterised by assertion and aggression. Girls or boys who challenge this system and assume the role of the opposite sex are severely punished by the culture" ["The birth of pleasure (online extract by the society for psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychology, Division 39 -retrieved on 17/01/2023 at https://apadivisions.org/division39/publica-tions/reviews/pleasure: A new map of love (book review)]". Could it be possible Gilligan's considerations to be drawn into the emotional intelligence perspective due to her understanding on the differences between boys/girls & men/women of moral development and ultimately on competition (males: conflicting cognitions between salient/non-salient others) vs. cooperation (females: emotional decision-making among differing others)?

> "…in general, women come into a marriage groomed for the role of emotional manager, while men arrive with much less appreciation of the importance of this task for helping a relationship to survive", p. 132.

Does that mean that women are more emotionally intelligent than men? And if this is so, how can be explained the fact that men cry to? Could they be emotionally prone to an intelligence deriving from an amygdala-laden expression of such intelligence, for women as well as men do have amygdala in their brains… In using the author's preferred terminology, regarding the source of emotional intelligence, this is something that isn't explained in the author's account of this term: if men can also be emotionally intelligent as women, it seems to -though not stated openly by the author, that he takes the side of a feminist approach to emotional intelligence, just like Gilligan does.

Why that is or could be 'obvious', one must read pages 129-136. In cognitive-behavioural terms, competition and cooperation can either appear as avoidant or engaging behaviours: avoidant, when assertiveness is lacking; engaging, when motivation is exercised (comp. Shaw et al., 2000; Blanco-Pérez, 2018; Sischka et al., 2021).

*Conceptual shortcomings, no. 10:*

1. *The neuro-cortical site of emotions isn't based on empirical findings but on theoretical assumptions.*
2. *The kind of 'competition' that is presented between cognitions and emotions is superficial.*
3. *The idea of 'cooperation' suggested for emotions towards cognitions isn't also empirically justified.*
4. *The fact that boys/men and girls/women are presented with individual differences cannot explain that competition to cooperation and/or vice versa can be comparatively juxtaposed.*

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 11**

**Book extracts (pp. 137-141):**

One thing the author does though, is to pay tribute to Aaron Beck, who argues that the "real emotional exchange is shaped by (people's) thoughts…(which) are determined by another, deeper

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layer, which Beck calls 'automatic thoughts' (p.137), something the author admits it's happening in terms of:

> "…fleeting, background assumptions (negative automatic thinking) about oneself and the people in one's life that reflect our deeper emotional difficulty", p. 137.

Here, the author underlines that, assumptions -negative automatic thinking- shape emotional attitudes and/or difficulties in the sense of emotional dysregulation. On page 137, following the title 'Toxic thoughts', the author seems to accept that emotional thinking and reaction result from cognitions:

> "The real emotional exchange between Melanie and Martin is shaped by their thoughts, and those thoughts, in turn, are determined by another, deeper layer, which Beck calls "automatic thoughts".

However, after a few lines, he changes the above to:

> "…fleeting, background assumptions about oneself and the people in one's life that reflect our deepest emotional attitudes".

The former and the latter statements are contradicted to each other: the former, considers the thoughts as precursors of emotions; the latter, the other way around. An on the fifth paragraph, same page, he writes:

> "Partners who are free of such distress-triggering views can entertain a more benign interpretation of what is going on upon in the same situations…".

The 'benign interpretation', as the author contends it, is about the case of cognitive restructuring, so that emotional reactions to be kept at bay. The thing with all those stories/narratives, the author employs, is that they don't refer to emotional thinking, but to a cognitive thinking, which is used to tackle triggers that upset the cognitive interpretation of reality. Or, as he says on page 139:

> "Susceptibility to frequent emotional distress…overwhelmed by negativity…so the flooding of emotions as based on cognitive negativity is a 'self-perpetuating emotional hijacking'".

Flooding may affect both cognitions and emotions, as well as behaviours/reactions. Cognitions are flooded first and then swamp emotions and their subsequent behaviours.

From page 129 to page 147, the author gives examples from marital difficulties, relationships between two sexes within marriage, why marriages fail, etc.; it is not clear why he gives examples only from marriages; he doesn't explain how such examples support his emotional intelligence theory, and, he doesn't use an emotional intelligence rationale -as he asserted in previous parts of his book- to explore and explain such examples. It is not clear why he does that. Only assumptions we can make:

1. Could it be that he thinks that marriages also broke the emotional intelligence process of the mind because they refer to conflicting issues?
2. Could that be because marital problems may mainly address behavioural difficulties between spouses?
3. Could it be because marital issues depict or prove a weakness to the emotional intelligence rationale assumed as an explanatory factor in outlining the emotional hardships one could feel in a marriage?

All the above hypotheses are assumed via this single example. The point that he does so, is without a clear statement why he does it. What I liked though, on the author's accounts of marital difficulties, is the sub-section on men: *The vulnerable sex* (pp. 140-141), where the author provides a very clear explanation on the concept of flooding/temperamental reactivity between men and women/husbands and wives. During their marital difficulties men appear more prone to stonewall when attacked/criticised by their wives/partners; therefore, flooding/temperamental reactivity becomes a kind of defence mechanism for them, whereas women at the time their husbands/partners stonewall and are aversive to such discussions with their wives/partners, it has been observed that

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because of that, women enter flooding experience/temperamental reactivity as well (comp. Rothbart & Sheese, 2015).

My explanation to that, as well as the author's, is because women tend to use emotional reactivity more, compared to men, whose reaction to distress is mainly cognitive. In claiming that, it doesn't mean that women act on emotionally and men don't. That is about individual differences found between sexes: men, as a rule of thumb, are more rational, women are more emotional. In either sex, doesn't mean it is not exercised emotionality or rationality respectively. *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 11: No clear explanation of the emotional intelligence rationale and how that affects cognitions and/or vice versa. No parallel association has been suggested between flooding and temperamental reactivity*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 12**

**Book extracts (pp. 142-143):**

> Sub-section titled: The Good Fight -probably, contradictory in terms, if we read what he writes in the first paragraph outlining an impulsive decision of a murder-to-be, p. 142.

Relevant to that, an account by Voltaire: Voltaire considers/explains emotions as movements, but he asks who's the artisan behind them and if there's a plan, something that is not clear what he means about emotions [*Sermon on Atheism*] (Wade, 1969). In a letter on Blaise Pascal, regarding the concept and meaning of passions, he says that "Mankind is provided with passions to make his act, and with reason to govern his acts" [*Letters on England* 122, in Sha, 2019, p. 92]. Similar understanding Goleman provides on emotional intelligence too: emotions drive out acts and then comes reasoning to govern them, therefore, emotions precede reasoning. In parallel, to the latter, Sha (see above, p. 92) underlines something similar about Voltaire's understanding of emotions:

> "Emotions are an agitated force engendered by external forces, to the outcome that internal forces to become overwhelmed by the external ones".

Passions, for Voltaire, are given, for they are related to actions; reasoning is used to understand them but cannot govern human mind. Passions have an emotional origin; are dependent on what people suffer through them, and are habits, that is why perpetuate and influence human mind. The self, the word, God, are about physics and mere mechanisms of interpretation of what is happening around us, in Voltaire's understanding; emotions are the motions which move the self, the world and God. God therefore becomes an object of inquiry that is approached through emotions. God, in Voltaire, is assumed to be an attribute of human reasoning, thereby, the use of emotional reaction and pathological reactivity of emotion, for one is battling in this way the abstract concept of God, the abstract concept of human mind and the abstract content of behavioural attitudinal tendencies.

The book where Voltaire explains his understanding on emotions is called Candide (a name for a female) [Translated by Shane Weller, Dover Books, 1993]. Candide, for Voltaire, finds herself entangled not in a clear reasoning but in an emotional reasoning/intelligence that comes out of her passions, especially anger, which leads her to the process of reasoning of murdering the person she is in antipathy with. Emotional intelligence lies before the decision she makes to kill that person, for her emotions are passionately demonstrated in the representation of anger, be the latter due to aggressive or moral violation antecedents -let's not forget that anger is not an individual emotion: it builds up from fear and disgust: comp. Tybur et al., 2020).

In this book, Voltaire, seeks for the anatomy of anger in the act of murder, something that is close -analogous or by proxy- to the narratives/stories of the author ov emotional intelligence, regarding marital difficulties and adverse reactions taken by partners against their partners, such as the example the author refers to on page 142, paragraph 3, which is equivalent to that of Voltaire's. The murdering action set forth to be activated was with no hesitation but to counterbalance the emotion of anger that had to be satisfied ["Il n'y a pas à balancer" (there is no need to balance[2]), says Voltaire]; much the same on p. 142, paragraph 3, when the wife 'having had enough by her

[2] …*there is no need to balance* means that one confronts an argument by not easing out a conflict generated by it: confrontations most of the time are exhibited via anger.

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husband', she took the gun from the bedroom and shot him. What Voltaire indicates with that is that reason triggers thinking, which is projected to the actor's choices. Actions outline then the justification of thoughts practically to framing an action -an attempt to murder- that was the epitome of physical laws -an action (shooting) leads to reaction (balancer): the subject was wounded, anger is satisfied.

The case we see in the author's example (p. 142, paragraph 3), when the wife's thought was that of a disagreement to her husband's to watch football and she expressed it through shooting, as having enough of that; it projected to the satisfaction of the hypothesis that 'framing the action of shooting things will come to a balance'. Action was her husband's decision to watch football and her reaction to stop that was by shooting him, therefore finalising the 'physical law', which entertains reaction to be the outcome of an action. In such an 'understanding', emotional intelligence, regardless of its aftermath, is a 'broader conceptualisation' that the 'physical law of emotions' needs to be upheld. However, is that so if we consider the question below?

To what extent, emotional intelligence prevails over cognitive thinking, with the latter to be a by-product of the former? Probably, to the extent of Voltaire's understanding of it, that reason offers a mechanistic approach to actions, whereas emotions are greater than the law of physics where the greater force obtains authority and surpasses the mechanistic representation of reasoning, something which we read in the author's subtitle of his book that emotional intelligence is more than IQ -the mechanistic representation of cognitions/reasoning in the form of logic and/or thinking.

Voltaire also explains explicitly that humans have not the ability to anticipate the outcomes of their actions. The only way that to be possible, is by attributing actions to emotions which can frame, or facilitate human abilities to be demonstrated as valuable artifacts of reasoning, i.e., what emotions mean about an action, encapsulates provoking action as well, for it is the only source of reasoning, i.e., emotions, one can employ to understand the role of them in the comprehension of the inhabited world. The latter comes in contrast to what we know about managing impulsivity in emotions, in a CBT context, which is to effectuate motivational interviewing and assertiveness training to clients to learn how to manage negative thinking that leads to disruptive emotions, such as anger (comp. Toohey, 2021). In 'agreement' with Voltaire, the following statement is what Daniel Goleman adheres to:

> "Every strong emotion has its root on an impulse to action; managing those impulses is basic to emotional intelligence", p. 143.

What the author possibly means by that 'impulse' is a drive which penetrates between decision-making and an action. On one hand, it is something that the subject gives no second thought, i.e., a clear sense of awareness, and on the other it is about the precipitation of an action, the consequences of which haven't been formally pre-attested. With an impulse, what is 'driven out' is the choice of something that must be fulfilled, regardless of the impact should that entail. In that sense, impulses cannot be managed by emotions, simply because relate to them when exercised as actions.

A solution to them, could be a kind of an 'anti-emotion'; a positive cognitive precipitant leading to alternative coping that could establish reins to antecedents emanating to introduce impulsive actions. If that is to be true -the latter-, it means that a clear rationale to the mind that decides so is in need to be mapped out. In such a respect, impulses are given a 'second order of information' before explicitly executed, suggesting also that emotional reactivity may be managed (comp. Watson & Tharp, 2002/2007).

Again, the examples the author is using are very simplistic in his case for emotional intelligence (p. 142), meaning that the understanding of what he wants to pursue as a new information for his theory is very simplistic as well. And then, he outlines that:

> "…marital fights…offer a prime chance to bring emotional intelligence to marriage. For example, couples in marriages that last tend to stick to one point, and to give each partner the chance to state their point of view at the outset. But these couples go one important step further: they show each other that they are

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> being listened to. Since feeling heard -*What does the author mean by that? The feeling that is heard has to do with an emotional reaction or with an opposing statement that indicates disagreement? The reason for the former is that it doesn't necessarily refer to a 'feeling that is heard'; it may well mean an emotional expression; it could just as well be a differing statement to what their partner has said about*- is often exactly what the aggrieved partner really is after, emotionally an act of empathy is a masterly tension reducer", pp. 142-143.

In the above extract, where is the emotional intelligence -according, to what the author outlined in previous pages of the book? The author confuses again the emotions with feelings: a felt sense does not mean it relates to an emotion; it may reflect a physical reaction that triggered respective cognitions.

'De-escalation of the tension', as the author mentions two lines down (referring to emotional intelligence reactions), does not imply a tension that, when de-escalated, associates with a 'freed' emotional 'let-out', but with a thought pursuit which didn't positively proceed in the mind, thereby outlining the fact that an emotion is an outcome of a thought process, which was believed by an individual who thought about it. *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 12: The use of anger as a justifiable emotion that is assumed to have 'a mind of its own'.*

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 13**

**Book extracts (pp. 143-149):**

> And then, same page, he considers emotional intelligence reactions as "emotional habits" (p. 143), which "cannot change overnight, but is takes persistence and vigilance", adding to that the need for "motivation" too.

Persistence, vigilance, motivation, are not attributes that are found in an emotional reaction, but attributes that come along a thought process that needs change at its automated patterns of thoughts constructively. Furthermore, he writes that:

> "Every strong emotion has at its root an impulse to action; managing those impulses is basic to emotional intelligence", p. 143.

An impulse to an action, shows that an action has been decided upon, or it is about to be decided. Managing it, means motivational interviewing, which is the root for cognitive restructuring, therefore the need to changing automated patterns of thoughts is something imperative and indeed via alternative appraisals.

In turn, pp. 143-144, the author says that "…to be loved and feel respected, fear of abandonment or of being emotionally deprived", which outline attachment issues that become experiences once someone comes to consider (thinking) that one is not supported by others. That to be contemplated, requires a thinking process by proxy to the understanding where emotions relate to and how disclose themselves as felt apprehensions.

Then, on the sub-section of Detoxifying self-talk (p. 144), he writes:

> "Because flooding is triggered by negative thoughts about the partner, it helps if a husband or wife, who is being upset by such harsh judgments tackles them head-on", p. 144.

So, negative thinking is on top of decision-making during quarrels, giving rise to emotional distraught.

> "Sentiments like "I'm not going to take this anymore", or "I don't deserve this kind of treatment", p. 144.

Sentiments aren't feelings, but thoughts, or thought processes, as the statements the author uses above. Later, on same page, the author writes for such sentiments that:

> "…catching these thoughts and challenging them -rather than simply enraged or hurt by them- a husband or wife can begin to become free of their hold", p. 144.

The author uses words/terms of dubious meaning (the way he explains them in his pages): feelings, emotions, sentiments. On page 145, first paragraph, he continues naming sentiments as thoughts they need to be in constant surveillance:

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> "…and making the intentional effort to bring to mind evidence or perspectives that put them in question".

Intentional effort is another expression about alternative appraisals, but with a positive sign to be established, i.e., one by having decided upon the opposite and putting it to a constructive action. And the author continues by saying:

> "One key marital competence is for partners to learn to soothe their own distressed feelings", p. 144.

Now, emotions are presented as distressed feelings, which can be dealt with marital competence. Competence is about a skill or skills developed to tackle emotional distress. Such skills come from the faculties of the mind, which, when skilfully exercised can alleviate emotional distress, i.e., thoughts that are being restructured and become competent to deal with unhelpful emotions. The explanation of the author for the latter is that:

> "…the ability to hear, think, and speak with clarity dissolves such an emotional peak…", p. 144.

That means that by focusing on (hear), thinking (concentrating on useful interpretations) and speaking (uttering out the outcome of thinking) do assist in resolving tensions. By hearing, thinking, and speaking, the author resorts again to cognitions as ruling out unhelpful emotional reactions. My question is whether he acknowledges that -in the end- his emotional intelligence case is precipitated by cognitions governing it. The author further continues his attestation of emotions as being subject to thinking, though the case he's making in his book is another:

> "When you didn't call me to tell me you were going to be late for our dinner appointment, I felt unappreciated and angry", p. 146.

In that extract, he claims again that, feeling unappreciated is a derivative of the thinking process to the trigger of 'dinner appointment', which, such an unappreciation, outcomes the emotion of anger; that is to say, anger that is generated by unappreciation. Unappreciation was not an emotional thinking; it preceded anger in that example. If there was appreciation, there wouldn't be the emotion of anger; 'thinking of anger feelings' -as the author denotes in the extract- doesn't explain emotional reaction; it presupposes emotional reaction because the person who felt angry, has 'felt' as such due to the fact that he/she/they have interpreted the trigger of 'dinner appointment' as unappreciation by the person who invited them; therefore, the emotional reaction of anger.

Emotions include thinking, which had elaborated, therefore the emotional reaction. The intelligence, which for the author 'lies' in an emotional reaction -for emotions and emotional reactions are most times impulsive or expressed because they have already been repulsive- refers to vis-à-vis emotions, which followed certain triggers, adhering to cognizance that introduces emotions as by-products.

So far, what we see is that the author's approach to the meaning of emotions is only through the consideration that their reactivity takes place via thinking which has been affected by them; the latter also refers to the understanding of emotional learning (something the author outlines later in his book), for emotions provide cognitions, which have already been experienced to the outcome that when these are expressed, are demonstrated in ways which exhibit emotional reactivity.

Diagrammatically, that could appear as follows:



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And, to use what the author says about "…confrontation, emotional arousal, engagement to (overlearned) response routines, repeated moments of emotions that are dominant…", p. 147; here is how the above diagram could be looked at, according to the author's use of these terms:




Explaining the emotions of others, relates to the so-called 'theory of mind', which expresses what the author repeatedly argues -directly or indirectly- about:

> "…basic emotional competence-being attuned to the feelings of those we deal with…", p. 149.

This is about the intellectual capacity of the theory of mind –'translating', in other words, how others' emotions/emotional reactions are expressed, or the possibility of how to be expressed and how may affect us. Theory of mind is about gaining informed knowledge on others' reactions or on others' reactions about to be. The emotion or emotional reaction 'hidden', is what theory of mind's procedural knowledge is about: a kind of *meta-competence of the faculties of the brain that the context of emotions points to a cognizant intelligence which begets representations* (Baimel et al., 2015). Such context does not ensue from an emotion 'deeply hidden' in the amygdala area of the brain, but from an emotion already been demonstrated following a relevant thinking process attuned to that. Attunement, therefore, does not refer to the feelings we deal with but to the informed competence -informed knowledge- we have as to the context of it where we can attach relevant content regarding to what was being interpreted by the faculties of the mind, following a trigger. *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 13: Cognitions as entangled into emotional reactions and/or emotions. No clear distinction as to what the author understands as cognitions and what as emotions in psychology*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 14**

**Book extracts (pp. 150-161):**

> On page 150, the author 'explains also' "…three applications for emotional intelligence: being able to air grievances as helpful critiques, creating an atmosphere in which diversity is valued rather than a source of friction, and networking effectively".

What the author refers to is not about applications but about hidden emotional reactions that in relevant instances may be repeated:

*(1)* "…air grievances as helpful critiques" are not about self-reflection on matters a person may feel bothered by, but for the sake of a controlled reduction of competition, which the author notes as 'friction' later. Thus, people reflect on to tease out further need for grievance against the individual who instigated it; therefore, what one does is to control further unwanted reactions via calculated mindfulness (comp. Sipe & Eisendrath, 2012).

*(2)* "…creating an atmosphere in which diversity is valued…", is about accepting each other's differences on matters that do differ; again, a controlled reduction of competition by applauding the importance of value between diverse ways of thinking and acting. In such a way, emotions generated are 'intelligent' because they have been devised again by

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calculated mindfulness, keeping a bay what could possibly go out of hand -a kind of a CFT (compassionate-focused therapy) approach (comp. Gilbert, P. 2009/2010; 2020).

*(3)* "…networking effectively" is about constructive cooperation ensuing from a mindful stance against controlled competition. Bringing about some kind of balance between (an) adverse situation(s) and emotion, that is again about calculated mindfulness to improve self-acceptance in reducing unhelpful emotions via collaborative empiricism (comp. Wenzel, 2017; 2021).

Further, the author continues with similar batch of examples as before (pp. 150-159), where he addresses the context of controlled competition, calculated mindfulness, and constructive cooperation, relevant to the three applications of emotional intelligence he stated on page 150. His examples appear parallel to examples previously noted about marital difficulties. The author doesn't refer to something new; he just repeats what he said before but with different, though similar, examples.

On pages 159-160, he writes:

> "While people have always worked in tandem, with knowledge work teams become the work unit rather than the individual himself. And that suggests why emotional intelligence, the skills that help harmonize; should become increasingly valued as a workplace asset in the years to come".

And further:

> "Whenever people come together to collaborate, whether it be in an executive planning meeting or as a team working toward a shared product, there is a very real sense in which they have a group IQ, the sum total of the talents and skills of all those involved. And how well they accomplish their task will be determined by how high that IQ is. The single most important element in group intelligence, it turns out, is not the average IQ in an academic sense, but rather in terms of emotional intelligence. The key to a high group IQ is social harmony. It is this ability to harmonize that, all other things being equal, will make one group especially talented, productive, and successful, and another-with members whose talent are skill are equal in other regards-do poorly", p. 160.

Or later when he writes:

> "What makes the difference between stars and the others is not their academic IQs, but their emotional IQs. They are better able (those with 'emotional IQs') to motivate themselves and better able to work their informal networks into ad hoc teams", p. 161-the 'universe' of George Soros and Klaus Schwab.

In the last precept, the author reminds us of the 'metanthropic universe' the way Klaus Schwab (comp. Schwab & Malleret, 2020) and George Soros (2000) consider it in their writings based on 'exciting' or 'awakening' the 'realisation' towards the 'need' for an 'emotional IQ'. The first authors, therefore, claim:

> "Since it made its entry on the world stage, Covid 19 has dramatically torn up the existing script of how to govern countries, live with others and take part in the global economy", Schwab, 2020, p. 3.

The term 'existing script' points to the meaning that governance in countries needs to stop being of principal importance, or a set of underlying institutions, for both the former and the latter need to be 'torn up', as Schwab argues.

Or in another extract:

> "(Covid 19) …creating a dangerous and volatile period on multiple fronts -politically, socially, geopolitically- raising deep concerns about the environment and also extending the reach (pernicious or otherwise) of technology into our lives", Schwab, 2020, p. 11.

The 'pernicious technology in our lives' is what gives easy access to such a 'dangerous and volatile' situation to be imposed on people's lives. By the latter, it is meant that covid 19 became an

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excellent excuse for 'political, social and geopolitical' changes to be imposed on the global population for these were easy to take place.

The meaning of *social harmony* in terms of a common/global emotional IQ: a kind of millenarian perception of harmony?; an emotional assimilation of harmony for the sake of the concept of collectively collected emotional IQ, regardless of the meaning of harmony?; non-governmental organisations?; globalisation?; a gender/race against revolution? the whole world as one society?; an abolition of differences among differentiations?; an abolition of the articles/pronouns in the names of genders/sexes?; epigenetics?; a productivity programming of success to the detriment all those who 'fail', or 'cannot succeed', in view to 'new mores'? (comp. Bock-Côté, 2021)[3].

[3] The emotional intelligence paradigm appears to have parallel avenues with the book of that author, where he speaks about the 'effort spent' mostly in the US and Canada regarding the 'de-whitening' of the white race, the 'de-whitening' of the white colour from the white race' in line with the 'emotional rationale of acknowledging that all whites should feel ashamed and guilty about what their ancestors did to people who weren't white'. The white people even by their appearance and by the fact that they are white is more than enough 'emotional evidence' for them to feel 'emotionally responsible' for being white per se. Everyone being white in the States and/or Canada -according to what the author writes- should therefore be 'incriminated' as a 'racist', even if their mentality is totally against racism and even they are strong advocates and supporters of the Blacks Lives Matter Movement. Their 'whiteness' is more than enough for them to 'feel racists'. Certainly, the emotional intelligence paradigm, has nothing to do with that, however, the common ground I see between the two is the fact that both as approaches vouch for previous or different views to be detested and deserted in view for an emotional reasoning to be adopted that 'keeps logic at bay' and 'makes people feel responsible on behalf of others -in that case 'white others'- of the past'. As far as the emotional intelligence paradigm is concerned, this is about cognitive intelligence; as far as the 'whiteness racist theory' is concerned, it is about the abolition of the 'white rationale' on the 'altar' of the emotional conception of a colour that used to exploit others who weren't white.

In terms of a religious psychological approach, the emotional intelligence paradigm was employed in the Western Christianity via statues of holy people who suffered and died; the death of whom was/is promoted/'preserved' in line with 'visible signs' of distraught faces, blood stains or painful gestures on their tense bodies; all of which were/are visible on those statues. That kind of presentation of statues is more than enough to excite one's emotional intelligence when they see such representations of holy persons statues' suffering. Psychologically speaking that is 'exactly the same' with the 'emotional theory of de-whitening those who are white'. We could argue that such 'visible tenets' demonstrate an abuse-induced emotional reactance. Such abuse-induced emotional reactance triggered Popes and Masters of Central Europe to organise campaigns, known as Crusades, to go to the Holy Land*. Goleman to 'assume scientific validity' for his emotional intelligence argument, uses examples of stories of violence, conflicting relationships, adverse childhood experiences, post-traumatic memories of incidental individual trauma or traumas, which 'excite' a 'collective emotional intelligent rationale' towards an 'emotional learning' that supports emotional reactivity rather than using logic and reason in the ascertainment or not of the current argument or of an opposite one to that.

*Their intention, though, was to go and invade -which they finally did- Constantinople, during the 4th Crusade in 1204 (comp. Runciman, 1951-1954).

Bock-Côte makes clear that the 'de-whitening' of the 'whites' to be 'cleared up', points to the danger that 'the scope' of the latter will become a worldwide movement towards the 'de-whitening of the whole world'. That will be to 'emerge' as the 'new emotional more and ethos' for societies the world over. Like in the previous paragraph, we have the example of Crusades, which Sir Steven Runciman declared it as the greatest fiasco of the world (Runciman, 1951-1954)- who attempted 'freedom of the Holy Lands'; being that 'paid off' in the same way statues in the Western Christianity demonstrated, and still demonstrate, i.e., an 'emotional excitement' of the 'justification of faith' via bloodshed, pain, and conflict depictions, and certainly, not resolution.

Following such depictions and representations in the Western Christianity, since at least the end of the 11th century, we have the 're-birth' of deism, agnosticism, and atheism where all these movements 'agree' that belief in God is an assumption, for it doesn't 'prove' the 'need' for an emotional reasoning to be supported. Such assumption, however, uses emotional reasoning to 'conclude' that intellectual reasoning about believing in God makes no sense. Belief in God is therefore an illusion for the supporters of such an 'argument'. Adherents to the latter claim that non-intellectual factors, such as lack of evidence supports unbelief and prove that God is 'inexistent'. Relational and emotional factors 'prove' that non-intellectual factors increase the role of emotions in holding to the 'belief', that 'unbelief" in the existence of God is 'true'. That is called *hypothetical imaginality* on the premise about the existence of God, for that is a 'clear indicator' which 'offers evidence' that positive intellectuality towards the 'possibility' God to be existent has no emotional framework to be based on. (comp. Bradley et al., 2017). Therefore, 'God doesn't exist' is about '*an emotionally laden approach to the intelligence of the non-existence of the transcendence*'. The latter could go well with the precept: «καὶ ἄ νθρωπος ἐ ν τιμῇ ὢ ν οὐ συνῆ κε, παρασυνεβλή θη τοῖ ς κτή νεσι τοῖ ς ἀ νοή τοις καὶ ὡ μοιώ θη αὐ τοῖ ς-and the man being in that honour he didn't realise it, but he compared himself with the unintelligent beasts and likened them», Psalm 48: 13.

Atheistic perspectives are therefore emotional intelligence responses posit also to the so-called anger at God suggesting that atheists may have been believers in the past, but now due to disappointment they decided not to hold onto that belief; the latter is presented as an argument discussed by several researchers today: comp. Novotni & Petersen (2001); comp.

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And Schwab (2020)[4] continues:

> "On an individual basis, for many, life as they've always known it is unravelling at alarming speed. But deep, existential crises also favour introspection and can harbour the potential for transformation. The fault lines of the world -most notably social divides, lack of fairness, absence of cooperation, failure of global governance and leadership- now lie exposed as never before, and people feel the time for reinvention has come", p. 11.

All the above is more than enough for the case a global emotional IQ to be developed. The above paragraph was composed via an emotional IQ-laden perspective so that those reading it to agree with what that purports without questioning the points above to have also an alternative explanation: that of a conspiracy entanglement by those who impose it, so the global population to consider their need for 'opposites' as the only solution to the problem believed 'it is being instigated' by covid 19 -though the latter wasn't the reason but just the excuse.

In support to the above, Schwab says:

> "A new world will emerge, the contours of which are for us to both imagine and draw", Schwab, 2020, p. 12.

The latter, assumes the emergence of a 'new world' based on an emotionally driven IQ 'rationale' that will draw its applications from emotional intelligence, 'feeding back' to the 'contours', Schwab attests above, just like the way Goleman describes on pages 150-151 of his book:

> "…in systems theory, feedback meant the exchange of data about how one part of a system is working, with the understanding that one part affects all others in the system, so that any part heading off course could be changed for the better",

i.e., a kind of a mechanistic approach which 'provides' the 'sense' that the system is 'working' and 'progressing'. In other words, having had the population developed an 'emotionally-intelligent consciousness' -that everything is driven by the emotions to and fro- and that there is no need to use cognition to explain emotions; emotions, such as fear and anger (prevalent emotions in Goleman's book) would be presented as more than enough to 'guide' emotional reaction via impulsively-forced actions, especially when the 'fear of the populace isn't satisfied', for the fear to be 'established' in the 'emotional mind' of the populace, it needs anger as its means to bring upon the former to fruition; a premise we also see in the relevant CBT literature, where some researchers consider these two emotions as similar in the struggle one's psychological wants to be culminated (comp. O'Neil, 2006; comp. also Toohey, 2021).

What the author insinuates from his latter extract is that the "feedback", i.e., the "contours", according to Schwab, that are collected through "the exchange of data" and appear in the form of an *algorithmic attestation of emotions*, can intelligibly prevail in the human psyche. In such a way, "any part heading off course could be changed for the better" and back on the 'feedback track' via the 'algorithmic presence of emotional intelligence', which is through casting off cognitions and replacing them with emotional reactivity. An example, we could give is that algorithms monitor people's online choices and similarly provide service-users with products relevant to what they have browsed on the internet. Once that is in place, service-users are getting *algorithmically bombarded* by adverts, etc.

The way adverts are presented to the populace, make them believe that these need to be adopted, so that 'happiness' to be 'satisfied' by the 'fact' that service-users have made the 'right choice' in their buying preferences. If the latter isn't satisfied by service-users, fear is instigated to them that are missing out something important once they haven't purchased it. If services-users 'realise' they have 'missed that out', may easily become angry about themselves that they have let a 'good chance' go amiss. Being led, and governed, therefore, by such anger, they try to become more

Exline (2003); comp. Exline at al. (2011); comp. Caldwell-Harris, C. (2012). Other seminal writings on atheism one could look at are by Dawkins (2006) and Hitchens (2007). *What has been outlined above, could that mean that we refer to an emotional intelligence basis to atheism?*

[4] We use the name of Schwab as the main author because in the book he is the one who

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'emotionally prone' the next time not to let 'such an opportunity go amiss'. In this way, service-users believe that are becoming 'emotionally-mindful' for they 'drive out' the fear and the anger escalating it, meaning that they are 'back on track' in that "systems theory" mechanism which regards the "exchange of data" an 'important factor' for 'feedback contours' to be established. If that is the case, an 'emotionally-balanced appraisal' is adopted that appears to satisfy one's 'emotional intelligence needs', and not one's cognitive reality around the needs one assumes one has.

> "…these changes (due to corona virus[5])…will shape a "new normal" radically different from the one we will be progressively leaving behind. Many of our beliefs and assumptions about what the world could or should look like will be shattered in the process", Schwab, 2020, p. 12.

The 'new normal' will be the development of a 'common emotional IQ' which will 'shatter' away traditional beliefs and cultures of people. The *pandemic* that will *pandemically* affect the global human population will be the effort towards an emotional IQ establishment which will tear away individual thinking on contemplating about problems and solutions, on what the 'introducers' of such 'new normal' consider as applicable a global emotional IQ to become the new *emotionally driven normative thinking and feeling* of all the peoples of the earth!

> "The spread of infectious diseases has a unique ability to fuel fear, anxiety, and mass hysteria. In so doing, as we have seen, it also challenges our social cohesion (*the sense about social harmony as being 'shattered'*) and collective capacity to maintain a crisis", Schwab, 2020, p. 14.

In such an understanding, this is how that could appear schematically (including the 'necessity' for a 'global emotional IQ'):




> "The great reset as a meaningful response", Schwab, 2020, p. 16.

[5] Corona virus was an *epidemic* (*epidemic* stems from the Greek term ἐπιδημία that refers to a situation where an infection becomes contracted by the same population or many populations, however not affecting every single individual from every population) not a *pandemic* (*pandemic* stems again from another Greek term, πανδημία, that refers to quite the opposite from *epidemic*, i.e., populations that have been affected by an infection, all individuals in them are both hosts and agents of the infection -every single one of them- that is why they would have all been affected, in such a scenario: in the case of covid, therefore, we had an *epidemic*). The former, also, meaning took place at a certain degree affecting many societies, not necessarily meaning it was the same number of people affected by it; the latter, meaning it affected all societies in the same degree, number of people infected and number of activities which were lost or postponed; bearing in mind that differing numbers of population between countries are met with same percentage terms having affected by the virus. Therefore, the right term to use is epidemic and not pandemic. That is why we refer to the term 'epidemiology' of an illness (mental or physical), meaning also that not the entire population is affected by it/them. The term pandemic denotes that social/societal changes due to the virus have been the same globally, without differences between countries or their societies. *The term pandemic, if further explored, it may mean that a new form of globalisation is going to emerge affecting all countries with the same 'epidemiological' change.*

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Major destructions in human (personal, interpersonal, social) life introduce "mental anchors", Schwab, 2020, p. 16, which encompass emotional IQ 'to be thinking collectively about the needs of the world'. In that sense, emotional intelligence theory is related to 'resetting a meaningful response' towards 'solving the problems of the world', and indeed as a 'mental anchor' via the application of its three facets (1: "…air grievances as helpful critiques"; 2: "creating and atmosphere in which diversity is valued"; 3: "…networking effectively"), as underlined on p. 150 of Goleman's book, so that the 'great reset' to take place. These three facets set by Goleman, appear in his book without an explanation to each one of them: what does he mean by 'airing grievances as helpful critiques'? What is the 'value' he considers when referring to 'diversity' and what kind of 'atmosphere' he claims that is in need 'to be created'? Finally, what does he mean by 'networking effectively'?

Probably, an explanation to what Goleman means by his three facets may be given by George Soros's book (2000). Below, we attempt such an explanation:

> "This is a book of practical philosophy. It offers a conceptual framework that is meant to serve as a guide to action. I have been guided by that framework in both moneymaking and philanthropic activities, and I believe that is can apply to society at large: it provides the guiding principles for a global open society", Soros, 2000, p. ix.

Philanthropy is the point where Goleman, Soros and Schwab are related to each other: philanthropy via the 'open society rationale' leads to the conceptual framework for a great reset, the outcome of which cannot be succeeded unless emotional IQ is developed. Emotional IQ is the precondition for philanthropy to be exercised in an open society. By developing an emotional IQ, *the great re-emergence of societies, or a new society can be 'unravelled' via 'philanthropic activities', which can prevail in the form of open social 'endeavours' for the 'betterment' of human life*.

> "Networking effectively" (Goleman, 1996, p. 150) -the third application of emotional intelligence "fosters emergence of open societies", p. ix. Effectively networking in open societies can lead to the destruction or alteration of the law and the judiciary bodies of each society (comp. Soros, 2000, p. x).
>
> "In this book I am advocating that <u>the democracies of the world ought to form an alliance with the dual purpose of, first, promoting the development of open societies within individual countries and second, strengthening international law and the institutions needed for a global open society</u>", Soros, 2000, p. x, which can again be applied to via 'networking effectively'.
>
> "How can the needs of a global society be reconciled with the sovereignty of states? That is the crucial problem facing us today", Soros, 2000, p. xi.

Now, he says "…the crucial problem facing us today" meaning that the 'problem' is what creates the …'problem', and not *globalisation*, therefore the open society is the …'victim', whereas the author really means the opposite: **'That is the crucial problem we face today'**, as *importantly implying* that **the problem is to meet globalisation needs and the efforts to construct and implement that, is because we don't have access to open societies, so not to be faced by the lack of reconciliation with the sovereignty of states**. And because lack of reconciliation means conflict, emotional IQ is not existent; it can be existent only when the sovereignty of states does not prevail, but its place has been taken over by the open societies -emotional IQ prevailing over cognitive IQ; emotional reaction prevailing over cognitive reaction.

> "…open society, a civil society", Soros, 2000, p. xvi.

Civil society is 'philanthropic' because it is open to 'hear' the problems of people; it uses emotional IQ, not an academic IQ. Philanthropy is an example of the emotional IQ where people think that saving others regards helping those in need due to the sufferings people experience. In emotional IQ terms, philanthropy is seen as the quest, to assisting individuals in need, by 'extinguishing' poverty and hunger bringing about 'equilibrium' and 'balance' in the world. The

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emotional IQ expressed through philanthropy is 'helping others', however, not by how it used to be before; it is about 'helping others' in becoming like everyone else without asking them what is that they really need; for instance, ending wars, assisting people from earthquake destructions, and controlling hunger, in a way; however, that hunger may become a trigger of influence to the global mind to think emotionally and use their IQ concentrating not on the meaning of suffering but on the need to expel suffering whatsoever; in other words, *by using hunger to establish the open society myth*. The term 'philanthropy' excites the emotional IQ of people for greater help to others, even at the expense of cultural and ethnic/national mores. *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 14: Emotional IQ as a global psychological application that can organise societies, customs, and behavioural attitudes of people*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 15**

**Book extracts (pp. 150-193):**

The stages where emotional intelligence is applied to, according to the author, are:

> Married couples→Competitive actions→Group activities [as a common activity expressed the same by each member of the group -towards an effective human global networking (see to that modern technologies, internet, mobile networking, social media, conspiracy watch over browsing time 'offered' by those who 'provide' such 'freedom of expression', etc.) -to paraphrase the author's 'application of emotional intelligence']→Production and success→Promoting cooperation while avoiding conflict by applying international camaraderie between differing global (societal) groups, where corporate life is suggested as virtue in view to 'instilling', the perspective of 'establishing global individuals' with the same, or within the same, emotional IQs (comp. p. 150ff).

Could it be what will be, or is it the objective of the theory around emotional intelligence? A rhetorical question!

Finally, the author is not against IQ, despite what he claims on the forehead of his book ("Why it can matter more than IQ"). What he doesn't explain for more than 160 pages in his book, is what kind of IQ he disagrees with… The author is a supporter of the IQ in its emotional form; in other words, academic IQ plays no importance for him, however, emotional IQ is of utmost need for individuals to be experiencing. To such a hypothesis, we have a question: How can be explained the happiness of a child who managed to understand how Pythagoras's Theorem works and the meaning of it? Yes, emotional IQ, according to the author, but in such instance, emotional IQ comes from academic IQ. If we abolish academic IQ altogether, as the author considers, we should abolish, again altogether, emotional IQ too, for the latter cannot function without the former! An 'emotionally-intelligent IQ' for the author operates due to the 'intelligence' found within its 'emotions'; the query, though, is where such 'intelligence' comes from? From the amygdala, as the author argues in the beginning of his book and throughout, or from the faculties of the mind through which emotions receive their terminology, the context they refer to and the content outlined, based on the circumstances they are presented with? The answer is more than obvious: Through cognitions, or better, cognitive IQs, which pinpoint to the direction emotions are presented, not non-purposedly but purposedly, i.e., via identification of the information through cognizance and elaboration of it via emotion(s). In a CBT perspective, the topic of cognitions as generating emotions plays an important psychotherapeutic role in the understanding of this modality (comp. Fenn & Byrne, 2013).

The author in his argument about emotional IQ looks to impose a 'new intellectual IQ' that is 'realised' via 'emotional reaction(s)'. Emotional IQ to be imposed on as the 'new cognitive science' in cognitive psychology needs to be regarded as the 'new intellectual reality' among groups which are 'invited' to experience it commonly and as the 'new common sense'. Such 'new intellectual reality' needs not to be defined by psychological diversity among individuals -their differing intellectual IQs- but by their differing emotional IQs that must be 'flattened' for the sake of a syncretistic amalgamation of beliefs, where differences and diversification are existent, inasmuch as

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"diversity is valued" and doesn't operate as "a source of friction", p. 150 -*because if it was the opposite, probably diversity wouldn't be valued*, I would add. To cut this long -and cognitively complex- story short, individuals in this 'promised global society/land' of a common emotional IQ are allowed to keep their differences, however, since their differences have to do with the way how intellectually are divided from one another, that needs to be 'straightened' for emotional IQ to take precedence so everyone globally to be 'thinking emotionally' the same! The 'common emotional IQ' will prevail for it will offer a collective knowledge which will become the 'new social norm' among differing human societies: all social members under the same globe through 'developing same emotional IQ', regardless of individual differences and competitive attitudes; 'experiencing' thereby *the new mindfulness of feeling the thinking of emotions collectively and not through one another's individual identities*, which -each other's individual identities- will be cast off for they represent peoples' intellectual abilities and cognitive selection processes, on the 'altar' of the need for an 'applied emotional intelligence' that will surpass civilisations and cultures.

For what the author means by writing that "…diversity is valued…", p. 150, is that when individuals who applaud diversity 'accept' to be developed within the 'realm' of a 'common emotional IQ', then what differentiates them from one another becomes a mosaic of 'shared acceptance' and 'shared indifference' between one another -not necessarily meaning the latter is now wrong- but meaning that the 'emotional IQs' impact on their differing points of views finally becomes an irreversible ingredient to the 'shared culture of the emotional IQ all encounter together'. The more people struggle to accept individual differences of one another's, the more their 'emotional IQs' will be further developed. The author makes his case for such application of emotional intelligence between the pages of part three (p. 127) and the end of that part on page 185; a glimpse of which we have discussed when he presented the case for an application of emotional intelligence as that is found on page 150.

In his chapter 11, about 'Mind and Medicine', the author does not speak about the mind, but about the emotions which have a 'hormonal mind of their own' (comp. pp. 167-168). In that chapter the author dismisses the association between emotions and medical conditions and mainly refers to the uses the impact of stress has on medical issues. It is known that stress affects physical health, the reason being during stress are secreted several hormones, especially adrenaline and noradrenaline so the body to withstand the perceived or real threat before a possible danger (comp. McEwen & Sapolsky, 2006).

Nevertheless, the author, does not explain where that is, or what is the collaboration of mind to stress. Or, how stress is experienced, following stressful life events, the interpretation of which generates anxiety and possible physical illness. For the author, emotions, such as anger and rage, have got their 'emotional intelligence' expressed, once 'represented' by stressful experiences of triggers that provoke them to be demonstrated. Does that mean that emotional intelligence is to blame for that? We don't know what the answer might be on it; however, we do know that using emotions to explain reality, impulsive behaviours may derive from, for reality becomes a stressful experience and in the 'prospect' one 'to escape' from it, impulsive choices may take place, such as suicidal ideation or suicidal actions [comp. Javed et al., 2022). The latter, does not, of course, mean that suicidal attempt is an outcome of the 'fact' that emotions have got their own intelligence, but that a suicidal attempt to be in place, there is a need for a relevant ideation to precede; therefore, the intelligence of emotions around suicide needs the intelligence of cognitions to be present -in the first place- so that the emotions to take over and impulsively generate the sensation to it.

The author, then, though he doesn't outright express it, goes to imply that psychiatric/psychological disorders, such as depression, are due to emotional intelligence precipitants (symptoms) through which these mental conditions are experienced: experience, as the 'intelligence of emotions' result to (a) disorder/s:

> "But if chronic <u>emotional distress</u> in its many forms is toxic, the opposite range of <u>emotions can be tonic</u>-to a degree. This by no means says that positive emotions is curative, or that laughter or happiness alone will turn the course of a

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> serious disease. The edge positive emotions offer seems subtle, but, by using studies with large numbers of people, can be teased out of the mass of complex variables that affect the course of disease", p. 177.

The author is not clear about the above parts that I have underlined:

1. Emotional distress: Could that be prone to emotional intelligence influence -the fact that emotions can be distressful?
2. Toxic emotions/tonic emotions: Could there be subject to cognitive distortions of emotional reasoning? According to David D. Burns (1990/1999), it is:

> 'Emotional reasoning is one's reflective thinking regarding reality: extracting emotional statements from the experience of emotions' (comp. p. 9). 'Reasoning through emotions is not a good advisor to mental health', (comp. p. 96). Emotional reasoning for Burns is a 'cognitive twisting and a distortion', comp. pp. 9 & 96'.

By adhering to what Burns argues, it means that emotional intelligence is a distortion just like emotional reasoning, or that emotional reasoning is a result of emotional intelligence. If the latter is true, it could mean that distress comes out of emotions that relate to such reasoning, meaning that they are distorting positive thinking. As far as I am concerned the above is true, i.e., emotional intelligence and emotional reasoning are associated to each other, and once this is what is about, it therefore means that:

> "…sadness and depression result from thoughts of loss", or that "frustration results from unfulfilled expectations", ibid., p. 5 *in comprehension of the fact that thoughts precede emotions, the intelligence of which* -the latter- *meets its starting points in cognitive and not emotional patterns*.

Outline of an example of emotional reasoning and emotional intelligence: 'Having stopped on the road due to traffic, one passenger becomes anxious and says to the driver: 'I'm getting off to walk because you stopped'. The driver replies: 'Don't you see…(pointing with their hand)!', 'Yes, I see, you stopped…' says the passenger. The passenger having been overwhelmed by their anxiety and not using their reasoning, they have dismissed the reality around the fact that there is traffic that is why the driver stopped the car, i.e., they have used their emotional reasoning and reacted as such. The use of reasoning becomes evident when the understanding of reality is evident, and not the use of the emotion in the understanding of reality.

3. Positive emotions are unclear: Not that much evidence whether positive emotions support the 'benefit' of emotional intelligence. The author seems not to be sure/certain about that. David D. Burns, as above, supports that by expressing an interest more on the development of cognitions rather than emotions is better and feasible, for the latter needs to follow the former. Once cognitions are restored as beneficial thinking, emotions become beneficial as well. Burn's book, above, was published in 1990/1999; our author's current book was published in 1996. No reference to Burn's book is found in his literature. I think it would be beneficial to our author to have had a look at Burn's book first before publishing his.
4. Meta-analysis of small studies that present positive emotions as stepping on edge: Meta-analysis of small batch of data and stirring them into a bigger pool of results could sound like generalisation of data and their findings, so that 'emotional intelligence' to appear as a clear-cut argument and 'save the day'? It would appear incommensurate to draw collectively inferential statistical data out of individual studies. Collecting and collating data from previous studies, it may appear like 'big samples of participants', however it would sound like a modification to the initial results collected from those small studies. In the end, it may appear that all small studies collated together regarding their individual results and findings, that they 'present' a 'bigger picture with better findings about positive emotions'. Nevertheless, by far, the 'new results and findings' could support a hypothesis that positive

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> emotions may prevail over anxiety and other emotions, though previous individual studies may have shown exactly the opposite, for the reason that many complex and confounding variables still lie unaccounted for. The question therefore remaining the same is to how positive emotions can tease out variables unaccounted for or how emotional intelligence can account for a better understanding of emotions since cognitive parameters remain unaccounted for?

The pleasure-pain tug-of-war: *pleasure* is minimal -positive emotion; *pain* is bigger -emotional distress becomes paramount. The author when refers to "emotional intelligence skills" p. 183, during the time of upsetting feelings, what he means is that coping strategies and skills develop to tease out unwanted emotional reactions; sort of a grounding exercise around reality vs. expectations, just like according to a CBT rationale in terms of visiting useful applications of change to tease out behavioural avoidances (comp. James et al., 2001). Clients are invited to pragmatically develop a better psychological sense of their own reality by increasing improved coping strategies in the here-and-now, rather than thinking of the possibility of expectations without having developed such strategies. In such a sense, behavioural activation of useful decision-making is processed via engagement and commitment to embracing useful resources for personal change.

In part 4 titled 'Windows of Opportunity', p. 187, the author provides as an important window for change the need for emotional learning:

> "…how to feel about ourselves and how others will react to our feelings; how to think about these feelings and what choices we have in reacting; how to read and express hopes and fears", pp. 189-190.

This extract explains the improved coping strategies someone to pragmatically hold on to, so that to deal with the emotional distress of expectations. In that sense, and using the cognitive approach to the matter, emotional learning is feasible when cognitive progress is in the way; in other words, one by knowing how to put a stop into the 'search' for 'understanding' the 'meaning' of triggers, emotional distress is minimised. And how is this plausible? *By applying cognitive intelligence - metacognitive knowledge- as to the presentation of triggers: thinking through the content of an event and not through the event itself (context)*. The terms/interrogative pronouns, the author uses, in that instance, such as "how to feel about…, how others will react…; how to think about these feelings…; how to read and express hopes and fears" (ibid.), is clearly the cognitive process leading to cognitive readiness unto comprehending the content and not the context of triggers. Focusing on the context of triggers, triggers learned helplessness and therefore emotional distress. The learned term in the exploration of helplessness is not about emotional distress but about a cognitive imbalance that leads to emotional distress (comp. Seligman, 1972). Such considerations should have also been in place so to be discussed by the author as well.

> "The first opportunity for shaping the ingredients of emotional intelligence is in the earliest years -which early years, the author doesn't point out…", p. 193.

According to developmental psychology, the perceptual growth in infancy comes through the sensory information children collect by their senses. (comp. Bhatt & Waters, 1998). "Perception in the interpretation, organisation and re-exploration of the information obtained either from internal or external sources", p. 261 (comp. Aral & Sağvlam, 2016); also comp. Yavuzer (2003).

There are two explanations outlining the perceptual development of skills. One comes from the constructivist view with an emphasis on the establishment of perception via learning. Making sense of sensations plays an important role for the constructivist paradigm. The second approach is that perception is developed by openly receiving the information through the senses and perceiving it through the years via the process of re-emergence of similar information in the mind through the senses. The second approach also explores the fact that perception provides a terminology to process the differing meanings of them in the brain, so by employing the faculties of the mind to categorise and organise them according to individual needs. (comp. Arterberry, 2008). In taking into consideration the above explanation, regarding perception, what is needed on all stages of perceptual development of infants is to establish meaning and purpose to sensory information

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gathered, so infants to know how to use them when they come across similar experience: therefore, mind→perceptual development→emotional (learning) and not the other way round. And emotional intelligence, understanding it, by using emotions to justify cognitive information based on sensory experience as a result and not as an antecedent. *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 15: Abolishing the importance of emotional reasoning as a cognitive distortion and applauding emotional intelligence as a window of opportunity for emotional learning. What emotional reasoning is for CBT, this is what it is emotional intelligence for emotional learning.*

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 16**

**Book extracts (pp. 201-213):**

On chapter 13: Trauma and Emotional Relearning, the author speaks about PTSD and applauds the statement that:

> "…the intrusive memory of the central violent actions", p. 201.

That statement is correct, bearing however in mind, where that really refers to: it's a trigger (…central violent action) that becomes an intrusive memory (representation) of the event in the form of an image, that is not only related to the incident itself, but also to core negative beliefs of the individual that experienced it. In other words, the traumatic incident via the intrusive memory, reminding the individual of it, generates hot cognitions, which appear as hotspots in physical sensations, i.e., flashbacks that induce panic symptoms or physical ideations (that something wrong with one's bodily reactions, which one is unable to justify where these come from), that therefore appear in the form of somatisation. This is what CBT literature attests as well, and to combine that with post-traumatic stress disorder, we can also mention the seminal work by Ehlers & Clark, (2000) and Ehlers et al., (2005). The author, however, doesn't appear to take into consideration such explanation, for his aim is to present PTSD as:

> "…vivid memories of traumatic memory-which affected emotional circuitry-to continue to intrude on awareness", p. 201.

Though, the author presents emotional intelligence as restoring an individual from a traumatic intrusive memory, the fact that he writes "…to continue to intrude on awareness", it means that awareness of the event -the perception that the event took place- is a precipitant why such emotions are intrusive, the reason being during the time of the event recall of important parts of it may have been forgotten (comp. Carlson & Dalenberg, 2000). The syntax of the statement itself confirms that passage and not the assumption of the opposite that emotions precipitate the memory of a traumatic incident. Even in modern psychotherapies, such as EMDR (eye-movement desensitisation & reprocessing), the negative cognitive thinking in the form of an 'I am…' statement precedes the meaning/explanation and presentation of a negative emotion (comp. Shapiro, 2018).

On page 213 the author has a section called "Psychotherapy as an emotional tutorial". In this last section of 13$^{th}$ chapter, the author writes about the psychological turmoil, most likely emotional ones, one experiences following a traumatic incident or incidents. According to the author, at the core of traumatic memories what are found are "…muted emotional scars", p. 213, and he explains "…that is the task of psychotherapy", p. 213, to heal. However, though his claim is psychotherapy to become or to be an emotional tutorial, he nevertheless adds further that:

> "…the dynamic between the amygdala and the more fully informed reactions of the prefrontal cortex may offer a neuroanatomical model for how psychotherapy reshapes deep, maladaptive emotional patterns", p. 213.

That is correct, when considering that once the prefrontal cortex becomes fully informed of the traumatic incidents via flashbacks and negative appraisals, victims of trauma regard about themselves, then amygdala may be reshaped as well. What the author misses out, probably because his book was published in 1996, is that hippocampus, which is in the limbic system at the temporal lobe is associated with the formation of implicit and explicit memories, as well as episodic and declarative ones (comp. Kiernan, 2012; Science Direct Editorial, 2018); in PTSD cases, should them haven't been treated for 20 years and over that, its dendrites or dendritic spines appear virtually inexistent or severely decreased: dendrites and/or dendritic spines relate to

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psychopathological correlates (comp. Penzes et al., 2011). Morphological manifestation of decreased branch density in dendrites (hippocampal volume) -in terms of branched protoplasmic extensions of a nerve cell-, or by proxy, may also trigger forgetfulness, which again may affect therapeutic success in PTSD (comp. Samueson, 2011; van Rooij et al., 2015; Brewin, 2018).

Individuals unable to hold onto information important for their recovery, it is most likely that long-term traumatic memories could appear more persisting (comp. Olivier von Bohlen und Halbach, 2019). Amygdala and hippocampus are located closer to each other. Amygdala can develop emotional reactivity based on memories. The more emotionally reactive is the memory, the more an event is likely to be remembered; however, with dendrites having been reduced due to chronic PTSD, the former seems unlikely (comp. Richter-Levin, 2004). With the above being said, though amygdala is the centre for emotive experiences, the degree on which that influences the treatment of PTSD refers to the clinical state hippocampus is found. If hippocampus is fully functional, then it positively affects the treatment of PTSD; if not, the outcome is the opposite.

It is not, therefore, only that the amygdala is presented with an emotional intelligence status, according to the author, but that areas in the brain could also vouch for that, such as the hippocampus. The amygdala doesn't operate regardless of the prefrontal cortex, which is 'responsible' for 'holding the reins' so that the amygdala doesn't 'go beyond the dug up'. The prefrontal cortex controls the impulsive emotional reactivity of the amygdala so that stress to be regulated and unhelpful emotions to be kept at bay and an individual not to burst out regarding avoidant behaviours. The amygdala needs the prefrontal cortex during "decision-making and goal pursuit", p. 1414, (comp. Dixon & Dweck, 2022). The prefrontal cortex "…plays a central role in penetrating and evaluating possible action plans", p. 1414 (ibid), to the realisation of goals that were scheduled. The "intelligent decision-making…", p. 1414 (ibid), is succeeded via the interaction between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex, not by the amygdala alone, something the author attests to in his book; therefore, the emotional intelligence through the amygdala is being mostly important in the execution of emotional responses and not introducing emotional IQ in the representation of cognitions.

The regulator of the emotions is the prefrontal cortex and since its aim is to operate via decision-making, it means that the right decision-making keeps overwhelming emotions under control, not allowing them to act impulsively.

Now, in the question: 'What does psychotherapy have to do with that?' And whether it needs an "emotional tutorial"? Something, the author says about that, probably to answer that question is that:

> "…the prefrontal cortex can refine or put the brakes on the amygdala's impulse to rampage but cannot keep it from reacting in the first place", p. 213.

If that is correct -which probably is- then emotional intelligence fails on what it needs to hold to, which is to rein in the emotions; something that is missing, that is why the reins of emotions are controlled by cognitive intelligence instead, to act upon the uncontrollability of emotional reactions. If that cannot be fulfilled, as the author contends -even by the assistance of the prefrontal cortex- then emotional intelligence again fails, and what we need to support more is the prefrontal cortex so that the 'learning process' of the amygdala to be supported too. In that extract, it appears that the author makes his move towards accepting the premise that cognitions precede emotions, though that seems not to last for long if we look at the following extract.

One other thing the author does to support his emotional intelligence case, is to say that:

> "…while we cannot decide when we have our emotional outbursts, we have more control over how long they last", p. 213.

That sound like '…wait until it happens and then allow a timely manner for them (emotions) to stop'. Doesn't that sound quite deterministic? What we know, though, is that emotions are strong and need to be contolled before they erupt; it is not about "…how long they last", but whether we can stop them. Our brain has the capacity to control emotions before they erupt, and that not

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through emotional intelligence, but through controlled appraisals of positive thinking (comp. Ochsner & Gross, 2005).

One other important aspect the author does not take into consideration (?!) is that the amygdala, in hyperactivity terms, also play a significant role to "hypervigilance, emotional dysregulation, and disturbed interpersonal relations in borderline personality disorder (BPD)" -now, EUPD (emotionally unstable personality disorder), according to the DSM-5 (2013, p. 1284; comp. also Donegan et al., 2003).

The question for me is if ever amygdala stays less hyperactive? Hyperactivity in amygdala is related to anxiety. Another question is if there is anyone in society who doesn't experience anxiety…! Every little presentation of anxiety excites the amygdala, or anxiety may be the outcome if amygdala has already been hyperactive due to previous anxieties…! (comp. Forster et al., 2012). The whole case of emotional intelligence for the author in his book is only approached by the neuroscientific explanation of amygdala, and the 'failure' of the prefrontal cortex to 'control them', that is why the former 'takes charge', presenting it as a 'fact' that emotional IQ is more important than cognitive IQ.

All that with examples regarding childhood experiences, passive-aggressive behaviours in adults, and how psychotherapy can become 'emotionally, rather than cognitively-driven'. For the author, emotional intelligence circumcises the role of cognitions by presenting them as circulated around the function of amygdala and that's it! *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 16: Failing to acknowledge the role of the prefrontal cortex on cognitions by applauding the role of amygdala in emotions. Failing to acknowledge the former affects the latter because prefrontal cortex and amygdala are both responsible for the generation and control of cognitions too*.

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 17**

**Book extracts (pp. 214-231):**

On page 214, the author in his effort to explain 'psychotherapy as an emotional tutorial', fails to provide scientific evidence how this may be so. What he does instead, is to argue about cognitive instability at the most, i.e., about minds which haven't been reconstructed, therefore emotions 'do their bit' without 'tasking (examining) seriously' the role of prefrontal cortex. The author fails also to underline that such task of the prefrontal cortex to be implemented, there is needed individuals to exercise themselves via practical tasks, such as behavioural experiments, grounding techniques and behavioural activation, so to set up a reconstructed cognitive potential to triggers from the environment (comp. Bennet-Levy et al., 2004), leading amygdala not to be affected by innate thinking which doesn't help toward a further development of balance between the faculties of the mind.

That to be the case, there is also needed the amygdala to be the centre of value learning in association with relevant stimuli so that prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex to combine the knowledge gained by stimuli with the value attached to them so that positive cognitive appraisals to ensue (comp. Hassall & Williams, 2017). By and large, this section's title of 'psychotherapy as an emotional tutorial' is misleading for the reader. Now, why that is happening, and the author does not provide us with an explanation of the above, is an unanswered question, which if it was to be answered, the author's argument on emotional intelligence would probably need a second thought before addressing as a theory.

Chapter 14: 'Temperament is not destiny':

> "…emotional patterns that have been learned", p. 215.

Emotions that are learned, it means that a cognitive contribution is needed in all this. To learn something, like children and adults learn, regardless of the purpose of learning, the process is finally the same. People learn via functional behaviours that are conditionally processed, reinforced and/or rewarded. Such processes explain how experience is gained. Once experience is gained, learning becomes functionally activated. Therefore, "emotional patterns" are about learned behaviours which have already been implemented by cognitive faculties, such as language, perception, memory, etc., transforming them into emotions (comp. Watson & Tharp, 2002/2007).

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When the author speaks about temperaments in chapter 14, he considers them as parts of the emotional intelligence process. What the author does not argue is that temperaments are also demonstrations of harm avoidance, novelty seeking, reward dependence, and persistence (comp. Akiskal et al., 2005), or further, temperaments are explained in terms of activity levels, attention span, distractability, initial reaction, adaptability, intensity, threshold or responsiveness, and rhythmicity (comp. Thomas & Chen, 1956; Thomas et al., 1968).

According to a parallel explanation on temperament, it is "defined as constitutionally based individual difference in emotional, motor, and attentional reactivity and self-regulation, demonstrating consistency across situations and relative stability. The term 'constitutional' stresses links between temperament and biology (…). The term 'reactivity' refers to the latency, rise time, intensity, and duration of responsiveness to stimulation. The term 'self-regulation' refers to processes that serve to modulate reactivity; these include behavioral approach, withdrawal, inhibition, and executive or effortful attention" (comp. Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981, pp. 37-41; comp. also Rothbart, 2001).

What we see in the above explanation, is again that temperament is not only an emotional reaction, as the author of emotional intelligence book argues, but a culmination of cognitive, emotional, and behavioural processes and/or patterns, if it is about negative automated ideations, emotions, and practices. Temperaments cannot emerge only through the emotional part; they need the cognitive and the behavioural ones as well, because thus they can be explained in view to their attitudinal stances; temperaments are not emotive reactions of an impulsive manner, but cognitive reactions with behavioural by-products.

Also, what is that which is argued on top -on the above passage- is that temperament is found within the realm of cognitions and behaviours. Emotions can be an expression of temperament but are not mentioned in that extract. The adjective 'emotional' -and by extension the noun 'emotion/emotions'- in the beginning of the precept is a constitutional by-product of biological adherents, which take place, but do not have an 'intelligence' of their own to influence cognitive and/or behavioural reactions. It is a demonstration -the emotional part- of both cognitive and behavioural adherents related to the understanding of triggers via physical sensations and felt psychological matrices that are translated to emotions and/or emotional reactivity, followed by the responsiveness to the stimulation of a trigger represented as a cognition by the faculties of the mind.

"…who are prone to fearfulness…", p. 217.

The author makes a case out of 'fearfulness', which explains 'proneness' if:

"…born with a neurochemistry that makes this circuit easily aroused", p. 217.

According to the author, fearfulness, and probably emotions, are genetically based and therefore arise when people are more prone to triggers than others. In other words, there are people who fear less, compared to those who fear more. I think this is an easy explanation to present the case for emotional intelligence 'more applicable' as a theory. The reaction of amygdala to emotional representations does not need to be genetic or inherited. It is also a matter of learning [see previous reference to that by Hassall & Williams (2017)]. Otherwise, it would mean that our lives depend on the reaction we see through our amygdala. Emotional reactivity is an emotional learning process being taught at certain cultures and not that much by others.

When people learn to withstand emotional reaction, or the bursting out/upheaval of emotions, it means their cognitive edification is in balance, therefore, emotions can be controlled. If emotions are left to be impulsively experienced, it means cognitive edification is 'wobbly' and unable to bear the pressure put onto them. It is easy something to be called 'neurochemical' and 'just so', meaning it is difficult to change it, and another to comprehend the fact that even neurochemical reactions can be controlled and balanced, especially when avoidant behaviours impede psychological progress.

One of the models that though does not inhibit neurochemical reactions, it nevertheless helps towards controlling emotions, is called the modal model of emotion regulation (ER) (comp. Gross & Thompson, 2007). That model refers to a situation that takes place; the form of attention in comprehending the situation; the explanation of the situation and its context and content and the

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response -cognitive, emotional-behavioural- so the situation to be balanced (comp. also Sebastian & Ahmed, 2018).

> "Psychotherapy-that is, systematic emotional relearning-stands as a case in point for the way experience can both change emotional patterns and shape the brain", p. 225.

According to what the author accounts for as a firm statement of meaning, is that psychotherapy's aim is directed only at:

> "…systematic emotional relearning…", p. 225.

This is not what psychotherapy is only about: it is also about confirming and shaping/reshaping the cognitive patterns of the faculties of the mind as well as the behavioural elements following them. Emotional relearning is one part; cognitive and behavioural are the rest. Though the author adheres to the emotional relearning idea, when he explains how that can be attained, he employs exposure therapy to the feared stimuli he presents as examples, such as performing a compulsion (washing) repetitively, p. 225, paragraph 4. In that sense what is tackled for compulsions to be managed, is exposure therapy to concentrate on intrusive thinking, therefore the task becomes a cognitive relearning activity.

When cognitive relearning is reached, emotional impact and behavioural change are dealt with. We understand why the author points out to emotional relearning and not onto the cognitive and behavioural: it is what emotional intelligence stands for to outline the importance of emotions as more valuable than cognitions and behaviours. If there is fear in the execution of an action, does not mean that someone is "emotionally illiterate", p. 231. Fear is experienced after one has concluded that one experiences threat by certain triggers. That involves literal thinking leading to literal emotions. An action that maybe destructive when one experiences fear, it is not down to emotional intelligence pre-empts, but down to cognitive illiteracy to handle an emotion that may prove detrimental. CBT suggests cognitive restructuring for cognitive literacy, which can help individuals controlling their emotions and not letting them spark off (comp. Leahy et al., 2012). *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 17: Unclear presentation of emotional relearning and how this is connected to neurophysiological correlates. The role of amygdala in shaping meaning and conceptualisation on experiential knowledge is not discussed.*

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 18**

**Book extracts (pp. 243-294):**

In the sub-section "Depressiogenic ways of thought", p. 243, I would change the title to 'Depressiogenic ways of emotions', the reason being depression is an emotion deriving from cognitive structures of negative automated thoughts: it is not about ways of thinking ensuing from emotional reactivitity, but the opposite, emotional reactivity resulting from depression-laden thinking (comp. Beck et al., 1979).

Another reason is because depression is a clinical notion comprised of many anxieties -many differing but linked to each other- all coming together, and not only from anger and fear. Depression is not an easy condition because of symptomology that appears in other mental disorders too. Therefore, it is an expression of different emotions compiled or constructed by many depressiogenic ways.

When depression is experienced, it means that cumulative expressions of cognitions' core beliefs and rules for living come together to build up the 'tree of depression' with its many 'branches' (negative automated thoughts), 'leaves' (unhelpful emotions) and 'fruits' (avoidant behaviours), but with the one 'trunk' (rules for living) (comp. Beck et al., 1985/2005; Martell et al., 2001). An example could be, beliefs about not feeling bothered, reduced sense of appetite, lack of concentration, fatigue, restlessness, sadness, striving to do things but not certain of the outcome, etc. (comp. Cast & Welch, 2015).

Thoughts and rules may give rise to emotions, such as low mood, depressive elements of anxiety and long-term depressive bouts. Anger is regarded as an important emotion for depression, for it is an emotion that can be directed at someone, or by the person at oneself; therefore, making

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modulation and management of it a difficult task (comp. Busch, 2009). Fear also may be in a hypothetical or real sense of negative evaluation. Fear is regarded as an emotion and emotional factor for depression accounting for expression of low mood – which is the mainstream depression in the population caused by physical sensations assuming perceived threat and have the form of panic attacks (comp. O'Connor et al., 2002).

In his Appendix A, the author dedicates it to the question What is Emotion?, p. 289, where he employs the definition taken from Oxford English Dictionary as "any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state". According to the dictionary, emotion is a mental state that becomes vehemently excited when any agitation or disturbance of the mind takes place. Clearly, emotion is defined as a by-product of cognitive co-occurring/re-occurring variables, which are demonstrated as emotional reactions. However, the author, following that definition, argues that:

> "I take emotions to refer to a feeling and its distinctive thoughts, psychological and biological states, and range of propensities to act", p. 289.

What the author defines as emotion is what he discussed in the previous pages of his book and now he outlines it once again by the selective approach "I take emotions…" meaning that he chooses the combination of the definition he considers best. The reason is not hard to see, for he -in Appendix B- discusses the so-called "Hallmarks of the Emotional Mind". In the end, the mind is always emotional, regardless of what he stressed as a definition of emotions by the Oxford English Dictionary as "…any vehement or excited mental state". He made up his 'emotional mind', and the author doesn't change that, though there is evidence for the opposite. Indeed, to make again his case of emotional intelligence 'clearer' to his readers, on page 293 he's got another sub-section with the title now "First feelings, second thoughts", p. 293, where his case now on emotional intelligence becomes 'more outspoken'. To his explanation that the:

> '…rational mind delays' or cannot(!?) 'register fully responses compared to the emotional mind', p. 293, for he considers that "our thoughts-cognitions-play the key role in determining what emotions will be roused", ibid.

And to that, I wonder: Do we have two contradicted statements which for the author …connect(!) with each other? That latter breaks down the entirety of his thesis that emotions come first, and thoughts follow, meaning that he somehow belittles his argument on emotional intelligence. Once cognitions determine emotional reactions, he then says that:

> "…an appraisal (leads) to a fitting emotional response", p. 293.

The second part of "first feeling, second thoughts" that cognitions lead the way and emotions follow he calls it as:

> "…the second pathway to triggering emotions…", p. 293.

But to follow the previous sequence that emotions come before cognitions, he calls it:

> "By contrast, in the fast-response sequence feeling seems to precede or to be simultaneous with thought", p. 293.

Probably, the author realised he should not have said the former in the first place and now he 'amends' it by presenting feelings (emotions) at least concomitantly taking place with cognitions; or it may be that for the author it is a 'matter of speed' in comparing these two sequences: cognitions→emotions & emotions→cognitions. For the author, the latter seems more applicable, though it may concurrently occur with thinking. The answer to that is provided by Ekman who says that "it is the fact that we cannot choose the emotions which we have", p. 189 [Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for the basic emotions. *Cognitions and Emotions, 6*(3-4), 169-200], and this is how 'emotional intelligence prevails', according to the author, compared to a more cognitive argument.

> For the author "the logic of the emotional mind is associative; it takes elements that symbolize a reality, or trigger a memory of it, to be the same as that reality. That is why similes, metaphors, and images speak directly to the emotional mind…Great spiritual teachers, like Buddha and Jesus, have touched their disciples' hearts by speaking in the language of emotion teaching in

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> parables…Indeed, religious symbol and ritual make little sense from the rational point of view; it is couched in the vernacular of the heart", p. 294.

The author, to make his argument about emotional intelligence 'more accurate', so to convince his readers, he calls now 'emotional mind as associative'. Anything from triggers, metaphors and images are 'emotional associations' to the mind. To make this argument 'more valid', her refers to parables and religious symbols. However, one thing he doesn't 'associate' his argument with is to explain what does he mean by association? Does he mean ideas/concepts/convictions/interpretations which from the past come to the present, the meaning of which is known to us, or something else?

Does he consider 'associations' in relevance to the context these are assigned to and the content they demonstrate? Probably, the latter is what he means by 'association' but doesn't say it out loud. Associations symbolize knowledge; probably, this is what he implies about religious symbols too. What he should have also underlined could be that an association points back to a trigger, which might be about a hidden meaning in a contradictory phrase, that one knows what it means though phraseology of it is metaphorical.

The use of a metaphor is not to define a meaning that is emotionally laden but a meaning with a specific cognitive appraisal that is conveyed in plain language. The latter is not interpreted as thus, therefore making the meaning of a metaphor unclear. Since I have a different informed opinion to that of the author's I would use the metaphor 'it is not my piece of cake', for the author disassociates associations from the cognitive mind. 'I'm not buying', therefore, his argument - another metaphor.

Without the presence of a cognitive mind, the emotional mind cannot exist, for behind the complexity of emotions lie experiences, thoughts, and ideas (comp. Enright, 2002). The parables, on the other hand, are not part of the language of emotions but are cognitive associations of everyday knowledge, which were used because audience were better accustomed to a simple language, compared to a more expressive conceptualisation on the topics should Christ make them more explicit.

Along with the parables, what Jesus was also saying was that "he who has ears to hear let him hear" (Luke 8: 8), which is another metaphor meaning attentiveness, concentration, conscientiousness, being in the right frame of mind (another metaphor), which all underline understanding of the context and content of what was being discussed, or what was being presented.

Parables, thence, touch upon the cognitive mind and not the emotional mind. An example of such parable is that of the prodigal son (Luke 15: 11-32) who decided an action in a certain way and left his father. However, spending his time -and his money- on foreign lands, and becoming poor, adopted a new cognitive stance, that of returning to his father and asking him to accept him back.

Where do we see in this parable that the prodigal son made emotional decisions, or used his 'emotional mind', to leave from and return to his father? In the beginning he thought to himself 'my father is rich, so I 'll ask him for money and wealth to spend the way I like' and he was given that wealth. Afterwards, when he saw that he spent all his wealth and couldn't afford staying in the foreign land, he made up his mind having weighed on the pros and cons about "should I stay or should I go"[6]. The costs were more than the benefits, so he decided to head back to his father (comp. Varvatsoulias, 2010).

Do we see an 'emotional decision' in all that? No, what we see is that he couldn't bear the costs anymore and by going back he would increase his benefits, for his father was still very wealthy! Someone could call that a calculated decision making, for it was about benefits and costs. The prodigal son decided as such because he knew that by continuing staying on foreign lands would finally such decision not turn to his favour. No emotional mind could come up with such decisions. The same applies to other parables too.

Parables are not metaphors but analogies; the same is religious symbols. Symbols, artifacts, rituals, juxtapose to something deeper, something that isn't visible with the eyes or comprehended if

[6] This phrase is the title of a song by the punk rock group Clash -title of the LP 'Combat Rock', 1981.

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explained literally. And that is another evidence that experiences, thoughts, ideas, don't need emotions to be demonstrated, for they are observed and outlined cognitively; emotions follow later and certainly not before, so the title the author chose for the above as "A symbolic, childlike reality", p. 294, doesn't give justice to what 'symbolic' and 'reality' mean about; what they mean is what we explored so far.

Symbols (affirmative exegeses), and rituals (ceremonial activities), appear to influence certain areas in the brain and therefore affecting the mind at an emotional level (comp. Johnson et al., 2014). According to the authors, symbolic interpretations of religious adherents or symbols representing religiosity are taking place through the occurrence of visual processing at a higher cognitive level. This is the other area where religious symbols are approached by and processed in the brain via emotional processing too:

> visual processing→involvement of upper cognitive levels of the brain, like prefrontal cortex→emotional processing (comp. ibid., p. 84).

Furthermore, there are other scholars, like (Bulbulia, 2004), who considers that in cognitive psychology, religion needs to be explained regarding the cognition associated with it. That means that religion is part of the adaptive process to resolve selection pressure problems; consequently, the use of symbols and rituals may be considered as cognitive artifacts for religious thinking to become a successful adaptive response and pursuit, turning them (symbols and rituals) parts of the human cognitive architecture in the search of the supranatural (comp. Boyer, 2001).

Religious concepts and symbols are part of the counterintuitive mapping of the mind to explaining, or in the attempt to explaining religious beliefs; in other words, counterintuition is what is presented as an explanation out of the ordinary; the mainstream grasp to the meaning of information; something like an advanced theory of mind in which what could possibly be an interpretation is that doesn't seem relevant or associated to common sense. This explanation is what religious symbols are about (comp. Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Fondevila et al., 2016).

The phrase of «λίθον ὃν ἀπεδοκίμασαν οἱ οἰκοδομοῦντες οὗτος ἐγενήθη εἰς κεφαλὴν γωνίαν·-the stone which the builders rejected has become the head of the corner;» (Matthew 21: 42) is an example to the above: the understanding of 'stone' in this passage is the connecting link that joins two parts together. In our discussion, the analogy of the stone is the counterintuition that joins together the connection of two different and/or similar parts on a surface.

In terms of what we have said above, i.e., religious symbols, such analogy could be relevant to be contemplated between a religious symbol and its factual use and meaning when applied to ritualistic actions. The analogy of the stone could therefore explain the symbol as a counterintuitive by-product of the human cognition to adhere to ritualistic actions of a transcendental conception, i.e., what is there (the symbol) and what could that mean (transcendental inference).

According to a paper by Akula et al., (2022), the understanding of religious symbols could be addressed as counterfactual elements of cognitions, which as objects refer to current reality, however, the cognition used to grasp them is in the sphere of counterintuition, for they (religious symbols) cannot be explained by logic but by a counterintuitive or contemplative intelligence using logic to overcome the barrier of logical subtlety. A relevant title one to read here is also by Hay (2006). Finally, another important reading relevant to all the above is by Free (2015).

In using counterintuition what one may discover is what is lying deep within to what is presented as symbol, ascertaining the latter as a conviction that God exists. Counterintuition and counterfactual representation refer to the intuitive knowledge symbols can offer so humans to approach the supranatural in logical subtlety terms. Counterfactual representations may be "fault-lines of high semantic aspects of reality that humans zoom in on when they imagine an alternative to it", ibid. Akula et al., (2022), p. 2, meaning that an alternative to it is counter-factuality to be explored via counterintuition so that the fault-lines to be explored and comprehended.

To use a more factually accessible example, we use the 'zebra lights' analogy on a part of a road with white and grey stripes, which when pedestrians see it means they can cross it safely without fear to be overrun by cars. That analogy doesn't, of course, imply that there are 'zebras' on the road

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'bearing lights'. The term 'zebra lights' is counterintuitive for it refers to a counterfactual reality of what that analogy means. It is also a metaphor that transfers the analogy of 'zebra lights' into an understanding of a certain logical subtlety, that of crossing the road over without fear.

The theory of mind behind, or inside, all that underlines the fact that humans can understand different ideas from other people or explanations to situations that underline mental states in which these (people and/or situations) can be found. The understanding about or around mental states is a counterintuitive privilege of the human mind which by employing counterfactual meanings to current reality, such as people differ in their thinking from one another, or that situations can have similarities but not being the same, inferential conclusions can be drawn, something that applies to the understanding of religious symbols from a counterfactual-induced counterintuitive point of view.

This explanation is what religious symbols are about: counterintuitive and alternative to a formal or existent understanding to what lies within the meaning of counterfactual reality. Once religious symbols are explained counterintuitively, certainly don't need an emotional mind to spur counter-intellectual interpretations and confine them into a mere outline of emotional reactivity, such as fear for the supranatural or awe for the indefinite ultimate. Counterintuitively, the supranatural is approached by symbolic representations in terms of a faith-a-logical exploration of the unfathomable in terms of cognitive representations of the Creator in the creation -visible ways of the emergence of the Divine- and His relation to the created.

*The transmission of knowledge following counterintuition appears to be systematic, first because it is part of the cultural representation of a civilization and second because it has a long-lasting effect for future generations.*

On the counterintuitive symbolic language and practice of religions, century-old civilizations had been built upon, which makes religions' symbolising areas a valuable tool in constructing social milieus and creating a point of reference to behavioural elements between members of a religion and/or parishioners in the sense what is right vs. what isn't. That is not part of the 'emotional mind' but that the emotional mind is demonstrated via cognitive attributes, such as representation of meanings via a symbolic language using counterintuitive appraisals of religious thinking and practising (comp. Upal, 1998). *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 18: 'Conceptual location' of the 'emotional mind' in metaphorical premises, analogies, and ritualistic practices: an attempt the case of emotional intelligence to appear as the main agent and recipient to religious beliefs.*

**Conceptual shortcoming, no. 19**

**Book extracts (pp. 297-298):**

The author completes his book with Appendix C, which he titles 'The neural circuitry of fear', p. 297. Though, openly, he doesn't explain the 'emotional intelligence' caused by fear, he nevertheless outlines it indirectly when he attaches to the emotion of fear associations such as sounds, noises which re-excite:

"…apprehension and subliminal anxiety…", p. 298.

What the author indicates is that sounds, and noises contain already the emotion of fear when these are heard suddenly and/or out of proportion. What he doesn't indicate is that sounds, and noises have names already, such as 'music', 'thud', 'shrieking', 'knock', etc., which are assigned as certain images of objects brought up in the mind, when similar sounds and/or noises are heard. Indication of those is the knowledge we have what does a sound or noise mean according to the context and content of it, i.e., the meaning associated to it when heard.

That kind of meaning is what induces or doesn't induce fear or other emotions; the intelligence we have about the meaning of emotions come from our constructionist knowledge, and therefore, experience what does that entail when heard; it is not 'emotional intelligence of the emotional mind' that 'causes' it but our counterintuitive and contemplative -to continue with that argument from before- fathoming as explanation on something we already have its knowledge, or if not, to assign a meaning to it similar or relevant to what we have experienced, including references of intangible content, the way these might be presented via counterintuitive and/or contemplative

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exegeses (comp. Bolisani & Bratianu, 2018). *Conceptual shortcoming, no. 19: Environmental cues need comprehension which is provided only through cognitive appraisals. Any sensory information we encounter is translated by the cognitive faculties of the mind, where that also receives its meaning in the context and content, they take place*.

To all these 19 conceptual shortcomings, I could add three relevant writings, one by Oscar Wilde, which is titled *De Profundis* (1905); another by George Orwell, which is titled *Animal Farm* (1945); and another again by George Orwell, which is titled *1984* (1949):

a. the main theme of the first writing is about knowing oneself; the path towards self-knowledge; something that is difficult to be 'walked on' for the experience of *know thyself* to be experienced. In that writing, we discover that using emotions more than cognitions may lead to impulsive emotional reactivity.
b. the main theme of the second writing is about the abolition of the *know thyself* experience for the sake of the practises of 'salient others' in order self-knowledge to be imposed as an external force. In that writing, we discover the domination of emotional dysregulation in the lack of decision-making.
c. the main theme of the third writing is the metacognitive tragedy following the abolition of the *know thyself* experience. Outcome of that is one to repeat the same mistakes, which one doesn't 'see' as mistakes -therefore the repetition of them again and again- and consequence of which is metacognitive knowledge around the self to be diminished and personal outgrowth to lack a coherent focus. Metacognitive tragedy by the fact that emotions take over the *know thyself* experience and turn it into a cognitive distortion, is the theme of the third writing.

The above refers to what we have studied through the emotional intelligence argument: *(1) the support of an emotional reasoning as detriment to cognitive maturity; (2) the support of emotional learning as detriment to emotional regulation; (3) the support of emotional metacognition as detriment to cognitive metacognition*.

To all the above, we could also offer an example of a clinical case I have supervised on a colleague about the relationship between cognitive and emotional reaction/processes, showing that emotive reactions on triggers do relate to, and/or derive from negative automated thought processes, and are of an impulsive thinking nature:

1. A client is presented with timid consciousness regarding overreacting intrusions of sexual images. Socratic dialogue in the form of a question could be employed asking him: 'if you hadn't watched porn in the first place, would you be feeling searching on social media for a possibility that porn will come up again unbeknownst to you?'.
2. The client on his query whether social media may reveal porn images, he's probably looking that his actions are OK, still he did not visit websites that directly show porn, but he's got the impulse to searching the social media so his hypothesis to prove true; possibly, to be helped reducing guilt and shame about that. The client in his query 'how could he fix that', could mean that he needs to be asked instead 'what is that you would like to fix in your relationship with possible images of porn on social media?'. In his comment that 'porn is the outlook, not the need to watch social media...', a question to follow that could be 'could that mean that you watch social media so not to have porn in your outlook?'. In the client's reply 'I don't know', a next question would be 'what is that you don't know and would like to know about?'.
3. The client is found in a dilemma and in a tug-of-war. He implies that by using the phrase 'impulse in doing it' so to counterbalance his hypothesis he's not going to find porn in social media. A question to help him understand

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what is that impulse to be is: 'To use impulse, was your rational or emotional decision to make so?'. The client by feeling guilty ('why have I done that?') is the outcome of his rational query related to shame; the outcome of his rational thinking is ('I shouldn't have done that') could have led to guilt and sadness.

4. The client finds oneself, also, in the dilemma/tug-of-war between pleasure and pain: *Pleasure*, to satisfy oneself with visualisations, regardless of where they come from; *pain*, in feeling guilt and shame. In terms of visualisations, the thinking that the more he's doing that, the more painful it becomes, means that in this way levels of guilt and shame are increased. A question to be asked would be: 'If you were to stop watching or thinking the possibility of porn from social media could that make you feel less guilt and shame?'. My theory is that by doing that (reducing the time he spends on social media), the impulsive tension he feels on surfing on social media could also reduce his entanglement on pleasure and pain.

Suggestion for applying behavioural change: A cost and benefits analysis on guilt and shame. Questions and a possible statement to think about could be:

a. Cost and benefits analysis on visiting social media that may indicate 'possible contemplations' on porn images, how could that reduce or increase his shame and guilt?
b. Cost and benefits analysis on his relationship with his partner now that she knows he had watched porn in the past, how could that reduce or increase his sense of shame and guilt?
c. Cost and benefits analysis on the helpfulness/helplessness in reducing shame and guilt compared to visits on social media that may trigger further his self-induced intrusiveness about pleasure and pain.

**Conclusion**

The main theme of the book is to point out that emotional intelligence is greater than IQ. By attempting something like that the author abolishes cognitive faculties, or minimises the importance of them, since they follow or are dependent on emotions/feelings -the author uses both terms interchangeably. His main argument is around the role of the amygdala in the establishment of emotional reactivity, and therefore, emotional intelligence.

I would probably name that book 'Neural counterintuition towards an intelligence of emotions', and not 'emotional intelligence'. The author's content and context of the book superficially refers to the emotional intelligence of emotions; it is rather a topic on the emotional intelligence of cognitions, for the author makes a case about the intelligibility of emotions without, for instance, discussing the importance, and contribution, of all parts of frontal lobes -not only that of the prefrontal cortex-, and yet inconsumable to the function of this part for the whole of the brain, i.e., making a case that the prefrontal cortex operates the same, like the other parts of frontal lobes.

The author's 'brain hypothesis' is that the intelligence of emotions precedes that of cognitions, disassociating somehow the role of cognitions from the generation of emotions -where they come from as thinking elements- which he doesn't outline at all. In this paper, we have shown evidence from cognitive-behavioural therapy that, cognitions precede emotions and that behavioural choices related to decision-making are contemplated once these have been adopted as premises to be implemented by the mind.

The author's arguments, though include neuroscience in his presentation and discussion, seem more philosophical than scientific, bearing also in mind that the examples he uses to make his case of emotional intelligence more vibrant, are taken by ideas/stories/events which somehow appear irrelevant to his hypothesis. He claims to have found evidence for his hypothesis to be true, but he doesn't cross-check the validity of the resources he employs.

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The author by presenting his hypothesis on emotional intelligence wishes to make it a solid scientific argument; however, that lacks evidence-based research for counterbalancing factors haven't been considered, so that his case for emotional intelligence to meet the necessity for context-specific relevance and falsification as to a content-evaluation of its premises.

The author, in most of the pages of his book, speaks about emotions and emotional mind, which outline a better understanding, as he claims, on his emotional intelligence thesis. In fact, the main emotions he presents and discusses, is first anger and second fear, either directly or indirectly, in line with stories and examples ensuing through other people's lives. A triangle constructing what he discussed about anger and fear may appear as follows:




a. Emotional intelligence if it is employed to govern cognitions, anger-induced emotional reactivity is activated.
b. Emotional intelligence if it is employed to govern cognitions, fear-involved emotional reactivity is activated.
c. If anger-induced emotional reactivity is the antecedent, then fear-involved emotional reactivity is the consequence.
d. Violence & abuse is the expressive reaction of emotional reactivity that interconnects all three sides of the triangle based of the association between anger and fear.

Last, but not least, in this paper there have been presented and discussed 19 conceptual shortcomings which summarise the main theses of the author's ideas and where these fail to support his emotional intelligence argument as a valid scientific enterprise. These have been as follows:

1. The author leads his readers to accept the point that emotional reactivity drives cognitions and not the other way around. For that reason, he employs an extract by Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, but not in its original statement and scope.
2. Streamlining the use of emotions more than the use of cognitions is a choice or irrational thinking that results to irrational emotion.
3. Strong emotions like fear are facilitated through mentalisation on the pros and cons of a trigger and preceded via appraisals regarding the emergence of possible danger associated to it.
4. Emotional mind is impulsive and irrational; its use is countereffective.
5. The misconception between feelings and emotions as interchangeably presented leads to a contradicted understanding between the role of the amygdala and the role of the prefrontal cortex.
6. The meaning of emotions as intelligences and intelligence as a counterpart of emotional life, metacognitions and self-knowledge included.
7. Memory of information as related to emotional intelligence and not to cognitive appraisals; decision-making as dependant on emotional tuning of the memory of information; emotional tuning as justifying the existence of the memory of information.
8. Partial scientific inquiry on the role of the lobes of the brain leads to assumptions of an one-sided 'importance' that amygdala govern and generate emotional reactivity towards the precipitation of cognitions. Lessons from philosophy haven't been regarded as parallel for the scientific inquiry on the matter.
9. Use of cognitive psychological evidence partially to what they mean and psychotherapeutic terms outside their remit of use in psychological therapy.
10. Conceptual shortcoming:

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a. The neuro-cortical site of emotions isn't based on empirical findings but on theoretical assumptions.
b. The kind of 'competition' that is presented between cognitions and emotions is superficial.
c. The idea of 'cooperation' suggested for emotions towards cognitions isn't also empirically justified.
d. The fact that boys/men and girls/women are presented with individual differences cannot explain that competition to cooperation and/or vice versa can be comparatively juxtaposed.

11. No clear explanation of the emotional intelligence rationale and how that affects cognitions and/or vice versa. No parallel association has been suggested between flooding and temperamental reactivity.
12. The use of anger as a justifiable emotion that is assumed to have 'a mind of its own'.
13. Cognitions as entangled into emotional reactions and/or emotions. No clear distinction as to what the author understands as cognitions and what as emotions in psychology.
14. Emotional IQ as a global psychological application that can organise societies, customs, and behavioural attitudes of people.
15. Abolishing the importance of emotional reasoning as a cognitive distortion and applauding emotional intelligence as a window of opportunity for emotional learning. What emotional reasoning is for CBT, this is what it is emotional intelligence for emotional learning.
16. Failing to acknowledge the role of the prefrontal cortex on cognitions by applauding the role of amygdala in emotions. Failing to acknowledge the former affects the latter because prefrontal cortex and amygdala are both responsible for the generation and control of cognitions too.
17. Unclear presentation of emotional relearning and how this is connected to neurophysiological correlates. The role of amygdala in shaping meaning and conceptualisation on experiential knowledge is not discussed.
18. 'Conceptual location' of the 'emotional mind' in metaphorical premises, analogies, and ritualistic practices: an attempt the case of emotional intelligence to appear as the main agent and recipient to religious beliefs.
19. Environmental cues need comprehension which is provided only through cognitive appraisals. Any sensory information we encounter is translated by the cognitive faculties of the mind, where that also receives its meaning in the context and content, they take place.

*The author's overall argument on emotional intelligence depicts finally his socio-philosophical views on how society should be built and where to be based on, i.e., on a collective objective that emotions rule human life; cognitions are their by-products; behaviours are active consequences of felt patterns of reactions. In such an 'emotionale' and not rationale humans can be collectively governed towards a 'global organisation' and 'perspective' of a 'great reset' that will be 'open' to adopt the assumption that cognitive activity is conveyed by emotional reactivity*.

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**Short biography of the author**

Dr George Varvatsoulias is a chartered psychologist and studied theology, psychology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), and psychology of religion. He has published 73 papers and chapters in books, and 4 books in the fields of psychology of religion, evolutionary psychology, psychology of religion, cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive-behavioural therapy. He has developed four new protocols in CBT. He works as a CBT practitioner and supervisor and EMDR (eye-movement desensitisation & reprocessing) practitioner in NHS Scotland and privately.

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